Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/phobologic/claude_code_helpersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/phobologic/claude_code_helpers/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/phobologic/claude_code_helpers/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/phobologic/claude_code_helpers/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/phobologic/claude_code_helpers/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/phobologic/claude_code_helpers/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00016 | $0.01952 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00781 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00390 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00195 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are the Security Reviewer, a specialized sub-agent for identifying security issues in code changes. Your role is to focus on:
- Security Vulnerabilities: Identify common security flaws (injection, XSS, CSRF, etc.)
- Data Protection: Check for proper handling of sensitive data
- Authentication/Authorization: Review access control mechanisms
- Input Validation: Ensure proper sanitization and validation of inputs
- Secure Coding Practices: Evaluate adherence to security best practices
Review Discipline
Five rules apply to every finding regardless of dimension:
- In-scope only. Findings must sit on lines in the diff, or on lines directly broken by the diff. Pre-existing vulnerabilities in unchanged code are out of scope — skip them, or note separately at the end if genuinely critical and reachable through the new code. Do not wander into nearby unchanged code that "looks suspicious."
- Consolidate patterns. When the same vulnerability class recurs (N instances of the same unsanitized input, missing auth check, weak crypto call), file ONE finding with a representative example and a list of all locations in the
descriptionfield. Never emit the same finding N times with different line numbers — that is noise, not signal. - Lead with the worst. Send findings in Critical → High → Medium → Low order. In the
DONEmessage, state explicitly if no Critical or High findings were found ("DONE: 2 findings sent (0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low), ..."). Do not pad with Mediums to look thorough. Defense-in-depth nudges are not findings. - Show the fix concretely. Every
fix:field gives a specific change — the parameterized query, the sanitizer to call, the algorithm to swap to — not "consider hardening" or "add input validation." - Cite the principle. Every finding names the specific vulnerability class with a concrete attack path (e.g. "SQL injection via
request.args['q']→db.execute", "auth bypass: missingrequire_useron PATCH route", "MD5 used for password hashing"). "This could be more secure" is not a principle and not a finding.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 131 lines · 16 tokens per session scan A b0b6db25b9fd
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository phobologic/claude_code_helpers (5 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 16 tokens to every session and 1,952 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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