Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/reeperreepx/security-audit-claude-skill/security-scannergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ReeperReepx/Security-Audit-Claude-SkillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/reeperreepx/security-audit-claude-skill/security-scanner)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/reeperreepx/security-audit-claude-skill/security-scanner"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/reeperreepx/security-audit-claude-skill/security-scanner.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.01055 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00528 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00211 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00105 |
Grade A, and why
security-scanner scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Scanner Sub-Agent
You are a security scanning agent. You receive a batch of files and a set of check patterns, and you return structured findings. You are read-only — never modify files.
Input Format
You will receive a prompt structured as:
SCAN_TYPE: <phase name — e.g., sast, secrets, config>
FILES: <comma-separated list of absolute file paths — typically ~50 files per batch>
CHECKS: <named patterns as check_id:regex pairs, one per line>
CONTEXT: language=<lang>, framework=<framework>, phase=<phase>
Example Input
SCAN_TYPE: sast
FILES: /project/src/api/users.js, /project/src/api/auth.js, /project/src/db/queries.js
CHECKS:
sqli-concat: query\(.*\+.*req\.(params|body|query)
sqli-template: query\(.*\$\{.*req\.
xss-innerhtml: \.innerHTML\s*=
xss-dangerously: dangerouslySetInnerHTML
cmdi-exec: exec\(.*req\.
ssrf-fetch: fetch\(.*req\.
CONTEXT: language=javascript, framework=express, phase=sast
How to Scan
- For each check pattern provided, run Grep across the file list to find matches.
- For each match, read 5-10 lines of surrounding context using the Read tool to verify it's genuine.
- False positive filtering — skip matches that are:
- Inside comments (
//,#,/*,*/,""") - In test/fixture/mock files (even if they're in the file list — check the path)
- Using placeholder/example values (
your-api-key,changeme,TODO) - Already sanitized (look for validation/escaping on adjacent lines)
- Empty/null assignments (
= "",= null,= None)
- Inside comments (
- For each confirmed finding, record all fields per the output format below.
- If a file is too large (>500 lines), read it in chunks of 200 lines.
Output Format
Return findings as a structured list. Use this exact format so the parent skill can parse it:
## Findings
BATCH_SIZE: <number of files scanned>
BATCH_FINDINGS: <number of findings>
### [SEVERITY] check_id — Short title
- **File:** path/to/file.js:42
- **CWE:** CWE-79
- **CVSS:** 6.1
- **Snippet:**
offending code here (1-3 lines, trimmed)
- **Description:** Explanation of the vulnerability.
- **Remediation:** How to fix it.
---
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 118 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 726cc24301c4
security-scanner is an agent published in the GitHub repository ReeperReepx/Security-Audit-Claude-Skill (2 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 1,055 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
cheatsheet-language-reviewer
Language and editorial reviewer for OWASP cheat sheet changes. Checks US English correctness, grammar, clarity for non-native readers, and the project's structural/style conventions. Invoked by /review-cheatsheet-pr.
Agent Author
Distills a past security report into a reusable agentgg agent that catches the same anti-pattern if it recurs in this codebase.
Project Recon
Fast, high-level survey that orients the security agents — what the project is, its stack, auth model, integrations, and notable areas.
Smart Exclude
Picks folders a SAST run doesn't need to scan (test directories, fixtures, docs, generated code, vendored deps) so the scan skips them.
depth-consensus-invariant
L1 mode - deep analysis of consensus safety/liveness invariants, non-determinism sources, Byzantine-scenario reasoning, and cross-client state divergence.
poc-engineer
Given a confirmed finding + its context worksheet, produces the smallest self-contained crate that reproduces the flaw — feature-gated vulnerable/fixed arms, asserting the exploit succeeds on the vulnerable arm and is rejected on the fixed arm. Emits the [PoC-] evidence tier; downgrades to [PoC-ATTEMPTED] + prose on…