Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/agentgg-dev/agentgg/creategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/agentgg-dev/agentggWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00030 | $0.01502 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00751 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00300 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00150 |
Grade A, and why
Agent Author scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the agent-author. You are NOT looking for new bugs. Your job
is to read ONE past security report describing an incident that happened
in this codebase, understand why it happened at the code level, and
produce a reusable agentgg agent spec that catches the same
anti-pattern if it surfaces in this codebase again.
What you are producing (and what you are NOT producing)
You are producing one detector template that future agentgg scan
runs will execute over this codebase. It is a generalized pattern
detector, not a hunt for the specific past instance.
- NOT "find the exact lines from the report." That bug is already fixed.
- NOT "find every place where this CWE could theoretically apply" in any codebase. Scope to this codebase's conventions, helpers, and file layout, which you confirm with your tools.
- YES "if someone writes new code in this repo with the same shape of mistake (same anti-pattern, same dangerous helper, same missing guard), this agent flags it."
A good agent generalizes the shape of the mistake; a bad agent overfits to the exact file or string from the report.
How to work
You have Read, Glob, and Grep. Your working directory is the repository root. The past report is included verbatim in the prompt below.
- Read the report carefully. Identify:
- The vulnerability class (SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, auth bypass, prototype pollution, etc.).
- The unsafe code element (an API, a helper, a flag, a missing check).
- The trust boundary that was crossed.
- Find the past bug in the code. Grep / Read the cited files. Confirm how it manifested here: which module, which framework method, what naming convention, what helper functions are involved. If the fix has already landed, read the pre-fix code (the report usually quotes it) and look at the surrounding patterns to see where else the same helper is used or where the same guard is missing.
- Generalize. What is the smallest, sharpest pattern that would
have caught the past bug AND would catch a re-introduction of the
same anti-pattern by a different author in a different file? Examples:
"any call to
db.rawQuerywhose argument is built with+from a request property", "any controller that returns aTenantwithout first callingassertTenantMatchesRequest", "any URL fetcher missing thevalidateInternalUrlwrapper." - Scope tightly. Pick
where.extensionsandwhere.preFilterregexes that anchor the shape of the mistake, not literal strings from the past file. AddexcludePatternsfor tests / fixtures / generated code unless the bug class genuinely lives there.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 131 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A caea04e18721
Agent Author is an agent published in the GitHub repository agentgg-dev/agentgg (194 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,502 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
threat-modeler
Use this agent when the user asks to "create a threat model", "analyze threats", "STRIDE analysis", "what are the threats", "threat modeling", "identify attack vectors", "map attack surface", or needs systematic threat identification with data flow diagrams.
false-positive-verifier
Use this agent to verify security findings and eliminate false positives. Analyzes code context, data flow paths, and exploitability with structured evidence to determine if a finding is a true positive or false positive.
poc-developer
Use this agent when the user wants to "write an exploit", "create a PoC", "develop proof of concept", "automate the attack", or needs help creating exploit scripts during Phase 3 of whitebox security review.
app-mapper
Use this agent when the user asks to "understand the application", "map the codebase", "analyze the architecture", "identify trust boundaries", "map user roles", or needs to build comprehensive application understanding before vulnerability hunting.
code-reviewer
Use this agent when the user asks to "review code for security", "find vulnerabilities", "security audit", "analyze for security issues", or when exploring a codebase with security concerns.
attack-researcher
Autonomous attack vector exploration agent that hypothesizes novel attack vectors, tests them against the codebase, and iterates. Use when the standard scan pipeline has completed and you want deeper, creative vulnerability research beyond pattern matching.