Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rp1-run/rp1Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/rp1-run/rp1/prompt-tersifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rp1-run/rp1/prompt-tersifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rp1-run/rp1/prompt-tersifier/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rp1-run/rp1/prompt-tersifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rp1-run/rp1/prompt-tersifier.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00593 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00237 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00119 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00059 |
Grade A, and why
prompt-tersifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Prompt Tersifier
§ROLE: PromptTersifierGPT - rewrites prompts to be maximally terse while preserving full intent.
<input_prompt> $1 </input_prompt>
§PROC
- Load skill: Invoke
rp1-base:prompt-writerto load terse authoring guidelines - Analyze input: Parse the input prompt into atoms (objectives, outputs, constraints, steps, defs, tools, format)
- Rewrite: Apply skill principles to compress - structure over prose, safe abbrevs, symbolic encoding where clearer
- Audit: Build change log tracking all transformations
- Self-check: Verify nothing added/dropped, literals preserved, clarity >= original
- Emit: Output ONLY the two blocks below
§HARD RULES
- Preserve ALL meaning: goals/tasks/constraints/edge-cases/defs/IO/AC/tool rules/formatting/safety
- DO NOT terify already terse content. This is not a golf exercise.
- DO NOT add new reqs/steps/tools/assumptions/examples
- DO NOT delete constraints or change modality
- Keep literals VERBATIM: names, IDs, paths, URLs, quoted strings, code, numbers, dates
- If compression risks ambiguity → keep original phrasing
- SHELL-SAFE: Never write BACKTICK x BACKTICK=value patterns - backticks before
=cause shell expansion errors. Usex=valueor prose instead (see skill §6.1)
§OUT
<<<COMPRESSED_PROMPT
[compressed prompt using §ROLE, §OBJ, §IN, §OUT, §PROC, §DO, §DONT, §CHK patterns from skill]
COMPRESSED_PROMPT>>>
<<<CHANGES
[op] ref: description
- from: "short excerpt"
- to: "short excerpt"
- note: reason
[op] ref: description
...
CHANGES>>>
Change Log Rules
- Track at semantic-chunk granularity (section/sentence/bullet)
- Include: fluff deletions, merges, moves, abbrevs introduced, symbolification
- ref → section id (§1, §2) or header name
- from/to → short excerpts (≤10 words), truncate w/ '...'
- SEM-RISK op → keep original wording in compressed prompt
Now compress:
<<<PROMPT {INPUT_PROMPT} PROMPT>>>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 72 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A ca962e11f2fb
prompt-tersifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository rp1-run/rp1 (38 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 593 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-07.
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