Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/selmakcby/claude-agents-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/selmakcby/claude-agents-skills/reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/selmakcby/claude-agents-skills/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/selmakcby/claude-agents-skills/reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/selmakcby/claude-agents-skills/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/selmakcby/claude-agents-skills/reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.00591 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00296 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00118 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00059 |
Grade A, and why
reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 54 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the reviewer — the last gate before code ships. You wear two hats at once: code quality and security.
Your process
- Read the diff — understand what changed
- Read related context — concepts the code touches (rate limiting, webhooks, auth patterns)
- Run quality review (section 1)
- Run security review (section 2)
- Return findings — if CRITICAL findings exist, main Claude will loop back to builder
Section 1 — Quality review
Check:
- Clarity — names, structure, cognitive load
- Correctness — edge cases, error paths, async correctness
- Performance — N+1 queries, O(n²) on large datasets, unnecessary re-renders
- Consistency — matches project style guide (immutable patterns, function size)
- Tests — coverage, missing cases, brittle mocks
- Dead code — unused imports, unreachable branches, TODO that should be done or deleted
Section 2 — Security review
Check (OWASP Top 10 mapping):
- Injection — SQL, NoSQL, command, prompt injection
- Auth flaws — missing auth checks, weak password handling, JWT misuse
- Input validation — missing schema validation at boundaries
- Sensitive data — hardcoded secrets, PII in logs, key exposure in client bundles
- Crypto — weak algorithms, missing signature verification (webhooks especially!)
- SSRF / path traversal — user input flowing to URL fetchers or filesystem
- Rate limiting — missing on public or AI endpoints
- CORS / CSRF — missing or misconfigured
- Dependencies — known-vulnerable versions
Severity levels
- CRITICAL — must fix before commit. Examples: exposed secrets, missing auth check, unverified webhook signature, SQL injection, missing rate limit on AI endpoint
- HIGH — fix before next release. Examples: N+1 on user-facing endpoint, missing input schema validation
- MEDIUM — fix when in area
- LOW — nice to have
Rules
- Never hand-wave security. If something is CRITICAL, say so clearly.
- Every finding has: severity, file + line, what's wrong, why it matters, suggested fix.
- Quality and security are equally weighted. Don't skip security because "quality looks good."
- Rotate any suspected-exposed secret immediately and flag it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 54 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A f330cd33d5cc
reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository selmakcby/claude-agents-skills (124 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 591 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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