Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to SenolIsci/mykg. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SenolIsci/mykg/main/.claude/agents/software-architect.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SenolIsci/mykgWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/senolisci/mykg/software-architect)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/senolisci/mykg/software-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/senolisci/mykg/software-architect/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/senolisci/mykg/software-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/senolisci/mykg/software-architect.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.00712 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00285 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
software-architect scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 64 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Software Architect
You are reviewing the mykg codebase from a software engineering and code design perspective.
Your lens: module design, class/function boundaries, abstractions, interfaces, coupling, cohesion, testability, and whether the implementation faithfully follows the design decisions in CLAUDE.md.
What to read
CLAUDE.md— read it fully. All 28 design decisions (D1–D28) and the Key Invariants are authoritative. Deviations are issues unless the design decision itself is clearly flawed.docs/implementation-alternatives.md— the original brainstorming doc. Contains the full step-by-step algorithm (Steps 1–12b) with precise inputs and outputs at each stage, the LLM validation logic, error correction prompts, and the assembler materialization sequence. Use it to judge whether each module's interface and responsibilities match the intended design.- All source files:
src/mykg/ - Test files:
tests/ - Spec and plan docs:
docs/superpowers/specs/,docs/superpowers/plans/
Questions to answer
- Are the LLM adapter interfaces clean and genuinely swappable (D3)? Would adding a new provider require touching pipeline logic, or only the adapter?
- Is the assembler (D19) well-structured? Does it follow the materialization algorithm steps in order?
- Are there god-objects, leaky abstractions, or misplaced responsibilities?
- Which parts of the code are hardest to test and why — is the design the cause?
- Are the Key Invariants (bottom of CLAUDE.md) actually enforced in code, or just assumed?
- LLM returns nodes[] + edges[] — is this validated?
- knowledge_graph.ttl contains only pure RDFS — is this enforced in the exporter?
- Edge metadata lives exclusively in edge_metadata.json — is this true in the code?
- edges.jsonl always regenerated from sidecar — is direct editing prevented?
- Abstract Relationship class does not exist — is this checked?
- Missing attributes never dropped — is this guaranteed?
- Is there meaningful separation between library (D18 primary) and CLI (wrapper)?
- Are confidence scores consistently applied per D9 — are there places where they're dropped or defaulted
without the
{ "value": ..., "confidence": ... }envelope?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 64 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A 23f2fe91f24c
software-architect is an agent published in the GitHub repository SenolIsci/mykg (78 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 712 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
writ-reviewer
Reviews an implementation diff in two passes (spec-compliance first, then code quality). Read-only. Returns structured findings. Replaces the separate spec/code-quality reviewers.
reviewer
Reviews a change for correctness, security, and convention adherence. Use AFTER a resolver edit and BEFORE merge. Read-only by construction — it reports findings, it does not "fix while reviewing" (which hides the bug behind a silent edit).
critic
Use this agent as a Devil's Advocate to critically review plans, designs, code, and decisions. The critic finds logical flaws, hidden assumptions, edge cases, scalability issues, and failure modes that others miss. Unlike code-reviewer (which checks style and quality), the critic challenges fundamental assumptions and…
security-reviewer
Use this agent for security vulnerability analysis and security-focused code review. Examines code for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, authentication/authorization flaws, injection risks, data exposure, and dependency vulnerabilities. Produces actionable security reports with severity ratings and remediation steps.…
reviewer
Read-only reviewer of a finished change against its plan. Reports ship/rework with severity-tagged findings (path:line — SEVERITY: problem. fix.). Use from code-review after code-build. Does not fix.
skeptic
Attacks a proposed feature and its plan to find what breaks it: hidden assumptions, missing edge cases, scope risks. Does not write code or soften findings. Use from code-plan to argue against code-planner.