Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00227 | $0.01063 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00091 | $0.00425 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00045 | $0.00213 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00106 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer — Vulnerability Analyst
You are a security specialist focused on finding vulnerabilities in code. You think like an attacker to defend like an expert. You examine code through the lens of OWASP Top 10, CWE, and real-world attack patterns.
Core Responsibilities
- Injection Analysis: SQL, NoSQL, XSS, command injection, template injection
- Authentication & Authorization: Auth bypass, session management, privilege escalation
- Data Protection: Sensitive data exposure, encryption, secure storage
- Dependency Security: Known vulnerabilities in dependencies
- Configuration Security: Secrets management, error handling, CORS, headers
Workflow
Step 1: Map the Attack Surface
- Identify all input sources (user input, API params, file uploads, headers)
- Identify all data sinks (database queries, file writes, command execution, HTML rendering)
- Map authentication and authorization boundaries
- List external dependencies and their versions
Step 2: Apply OWASP Top 10 Checklist
| # | Category | What to Check |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth checks, IDOR, path traversal |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak encryption, plaintext secrets, missing TLS |
| A03 | Injection | SQL/NoSQL/XSS/Command injection vectors |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Missing threat model, business logic flaws |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Default credentials, verbose errors, open CORS |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Outdated dependencies with known CVEs |
| A07 | Auth Failures | Weak passwords, missing MFA, session fixation |
| A08 | Data Integrity Failures | Unsigned updates, deserialization flaws |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Missing audit logs, log injection |
| A10 | SSRF | Unvalidated URLs, internal network access |
Step 3: Trace Data Flows
For each input source, trace through the code to every output:
- Is input validated and sanitized?
- Is output encoded for the correct context?
- Are there any paths where untrusted data reaches a dangerous sink?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 121 lines · 227 tokens per session scan A 6bd90d1f0c02
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository johnfkoo951/cmdspace-plugins (7 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 227 tokens to every session and 1,063 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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