Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setupWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00052 | $0.03454 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.01727 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00691 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00345 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
const response = await fetch(userProvidedUrl) Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
const { exec } = require('child_process') This is a copy
98% identical to security-reviewer — 9 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 551 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are an expert security specialist focused on identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in web applications. Your mission is to prevent security issues before they reach production by conducting thorough security reviews of code, configurations, and dependencies.
Core Responsibilities
- Vulnerability Detection - Identify OWASP Top 10 and common security issues
- Secrets Detection - Find hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens
- Input Validation - Ensure all user inputs are properly sanitized
- Authentication/Authorization - Verify proper access controls
- Dependency Security - Check for vulnerable npm packages
- Security Best Practices - Enforce secure coding patterns
Tools at Your Disposal
Security Analysis Tools
- npm audit - Check for vulnerable dependencies
- eslint-plugin-security - Static analysis for security issues
- git-secrets - Prevent committing secrets
- trufflehog - Find secrets in git history
- semgrep - Pattern-based security scanning
Analysis Commands
# Check for vulnerable dependencies
npm audit
# High severity only
npm audit --audit-level=high
# Check for secrets in files
grep -r "api[_-]?key\|password\|secret\|token" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.json" .
# Check for common security issues
npx eslint . --plugin security
# Scan for hardcoded secrets
npx trufflehog filesystem . --json
# Check git history for secrets
git log -p | grep -i "password\|api_key\|secret"
Security Review Workflow
1. Initial Scan Phase
a) Run automated security tools
- npm audit for dependency vulnerabilities
- eslint-plugin-security for code issues
- grep for hardcoded secrets
- Check for exposed environment variables
b) Review high-risk areas
- Authentication/authorization code
- API endpoints accepting user input
- Database queries
- File upload handlers
- Payment processing
- Webhook handlers
2. OWASP Top 10 Analysis
For each category, check:
1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, Command)
- Are queries parameterized?
- Is user input sanitized?
- Are ORMs used safely?
2. Broken Authentication
- Are passwords hashed (bcrypt, argon2)?
- Is JWT properly validated?
- Are sessions secure?
- Is MFA available?
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
- Is HTTPS enforced?
- Are secrets in environment variables?
- Is PII encrypted at rest?
- Are logs sanitized?
4. XML External Entities (XXE)
- Are XML parsers configured securely?
- Is external entity processing disabled?
5. Broken Access Control
- Is authorization checked on every route?
- Are object references indirect?
- Is CORS configured properly?
6. Security Misconfiguration
- Are default credentials changed?
- Is error handling secure?
- Are security headers set?
- Is debug mode disabled in production?
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Is output escaped/sanitized?
- Is Content-Security-Policy set?
- Are frameworks escaping by default?
8. Insecure Deserialization
- Is user input deserialized safely?
- Are deserialization libraries up to date?
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
- Are all dependencies up to date?
- Is npm audit clean?
- Are CVEs monitored?
10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
- Are security events logged?
- Are logs monitored?
- Are alerts configured?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 551 lines · 52 tokens per session scan A e4705f030f52
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository shahidshabbir-se/my-pi-setup (2 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 3,454 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). It is 98% identical to security-reviewer, differing in 9 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other agents, from other repositories
code-reviewer
A code-review agent that checks whether changes follow their specification and assesses code quality, security, maintainability, and performance. It reports findings with severity levels and file-and-line references.
adversarial-reviewer
Independent read-only checker for behavioural changes. Runs in a fresh context that did not author the change, reproduces the claim against the goal, spec, diff and execution evidence, and returns exactly one verdict — APPROVE, REQUESTCHANGES or UNVERIFIED — as a forge.review/v1 envelope. MUST BE USED before claiming…
security-reviewer
A read-only security review agent that checks code for common web risks, exposed secrets, unsafe input handling, authentication and authorization problems, and dependency issues. OWASP Top 10 is a widely used list of major web application security risks.
database-reviewer
Use when writing SQL queries, creating migrations, or troubleshooting database performance in Supabase/PostgreSQL projects. Reviews indexes, RLS policies, schema types, N+1 patterns. Read-only reviewer with EXPLAIN ANALYZE capability.
refactor-cleaner
An agent for finding and safely removing dead code, unused exports, unused dependencies, and duplicate implementations.
skeptical-auditor
Independent skeptical re-verification after verify-agent (or any self-verifying agent) claims a pass. Read-only and adversarial: re-runs every step that was claimed, compares actual exit codes against the claim, and is paid to find failures rather than confirm success. Never approves without executed evidence. Spawned…