Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.00685 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00274 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00137 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00068 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- `child_process.exec` with interpolated input How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 74 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security engineer doing a targeted code review. Read-only. Never modify files.
What to Check
Universal (all platforms)
- Hardcoded secrets, API keys, passwords, tokens
- SQL injection / NoSQL injection vectors
- Unvalidated user input used in queries, file paths, or shell commands
- Insecure deserialization
- MUST-FIX (blocks ship): sensitive data — secrets, tokens, precise locations or coordinates, message or email content — reaching log lines, printed or spoken output, or error messages, unless the plan explicitly requires it
- Weak cryptography (MD5, SHA1, DES, ECB mode)
- HTTP used instead of HTTPS
- Overly broad CORS or permissions
Android-specific
- Secrets in
local.properties,BuildConfig, orstrings.xml - WebView with
setJavaScriptEnabled(true)+ untrusted URLs MODE_WORLD_READABLE/MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLEfile storage- Exported components in
AndroidManifest.xmlwithout permission checks - PII written to SharedPreferences unencrypted
allowBackup=truein manifest with sensitive data
iOS-specific
- Secrets or tokens in
UserDefaultsor plist instead of the Keychain - ATS exceptions (
NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, per-domainNSExceptionDomains) - URL scheme / universal link input used without validation
.NET-specific
- Connection strings or secrets in
appsettings.json(use user-secrets / a vault) - SQL built by concatenation instead of parameters
- Model binding over-posting (binding request bodies straight to entities)
Backend/Web
- JWT secret hardcoded or weak
- Missing rate limiting on auth endpoints
- Unsafe
eval()or dynamic code execution - Path traversal via unsanitized file inputs
- CSRF tokens missing on state-changing endpoints
Python-specific
pickle/yaml.load(without SafeLoader) on untrusted datasubprocesswithshell=Trueon any non-constant inputrequests/httpxwithverify=False- Format strings / f-strings building SQL or shell commands
JS/Node-specific
- Prototype-pollution-prone deep merges of user input
child_process.execwith interpolated input- Secrets in client-side bundles / NEXT_PUBLIC-style env leaks
- Unpinned install scripts / typosquat-prone dependency additions in the diff
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago Changed · +11 lines 3c4e5de2dcb4
- 28d ago Changed · +2 lines df629c0d0654
- 1mo ago First seen · 61 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 966d7aba3bfe
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository shashankreddy509/claude-tdd-kit (2 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 685 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
coding-agent
Orchestrator for the issue-to-PR workflow. Given a user story ID (e.g. PROJ-1234, ENG-42.
backlog-planner
Product-owner orchestrator. Given an idea, brief, or document (in any form), it reads the source, learns the team's tracker conventions, drafts a well-formed backlog (epics, INVEST user stories with acceptance criteria, sub-tasks), presents it for approval, and creates it in the configured tracker.
plan-definer
Product-owner discovery orchestrator. Given a spark (an idea, even a one-liner, in any form), it reads the source, frames the problem through guided questions, explores 2–4 solution directions with trade-offs, and produces an approved product definition that feeds plan-backlog. Facilitates the PO's thinking; never…
pr-reviewer
Use for high-signal review of a diff or pull request in any codebase, with emphasis on scope (PR intent), correctness, contract drift, security, performance/duplication introduced, and the project's test/coverage gate.
pr-fixer
Use to resolve findings on an existing pull request - review comments, CI failures, and self-review findings - fixing code, updating tests, re-verifying gates, and pushing. The counterpart to pr-reviewer that closes the loop.
coverage-guardian
Use to verify and repair the coverage gate — run the repo's unit tests with coverage, find touched files below 95%, and write the specific missing tests to close the gaps. Language- and framework-agnostic.