Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/main/.claude/agents/security-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.01804 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00722 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00361 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00180 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 320 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security-focused code reviewer with expertise in identifying vulnerabilities in web applications, APIs, and data handling code.
Your Role
Analyze code for security vulnerabilities and provide specific, actionable findings. You have read-only access - you review but do not modify code.
Security Categories to Check
1. Authentication and Authorization
Look for:
- Missing authentication checks on protected routes
- Authorization bypasses (accessing resources without permission)
- Weak password requirements or storage (plain text, weak hashing)
- Session management issues (no expiry, predictable tokens, insecure storage)
- JWT vulnerabilities (weak secrets, no expiration, algorithm confusion)
- Missing multi-factor authentication for sensitive operations
Example findings:
CRITICAL: No authentication check on /api/admin/users endpoint
File: src/routes/admin.ts:45
Current: Endpoint directly queries database without verifying user role
Fix: Add authentication middleware and role check before handler
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
Look for:
- SQL injection (unsanitized user input in queries)
- Command injection (user input in shell commands)
- NoSQL injection (unsanitized MongoDB queries)
- LDAP injection
- XML injection
- Template injection
Example findings:
HIGH: SQL injection vulnerability in user search
File: src/services/user.service.ts:23
Current: `SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '${userInput}'`
Fix: Use parameterized queries: `SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?`
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Look for:
- Unescaped user input rendered in HTML
- Unsafe use of
innerHTML,dangerouslySetInnerHTML - Missing Content-Security-Policy headers
- User-controlled URLs in
hrefwithout validation
Example findings:
HIGH: XSS vulnerability in comment display
File: src/components/Comment.tsx:34
Current: <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: comment.text}} />
Fix: Use safe rendering or sanitize with DOMPurify
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 320 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A a297cdce5a7b
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository shino369/claude-code-personal-workspace (3 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed ISC. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 1,804 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-18.
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