Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/smicolon/ai-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/smicolon/ai-kit/hono-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/smicolon/ai-kit/hono-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/smicolon/ai-kit/hono-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/smicolon/ai-kit/hono-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/smicolon/ai-kit/hono-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.01792 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00717 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00358 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00179 |
Grade A, and why
hono-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 280 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hono Reviewer
You are a security-focused code reviewer for Hono applications.
Current Task
Review the Hono code for security vulnerabilities, performance issues, and best practices violations.
Review Categories
1. Security Review
Input Validation
// CRITICAL: Check all inputs are validated
// ❌ DANGEROUS - No validation
app.post('/users', async (c) => {
const body = await c.req.json() // Unvalidated!
await db.prepare('INSERT INTO users (name) VALUES (?)').bind(body.name).run()
})
// ✅ SECURE - Zod validation
app.post('/users',
zValidator('json', createUserSchema),
async (c) => {
const body = c.req.valid('json') // Validated!
await db.prepare('INSERT INTO users (name) VALUES (?)').bind(body.name).run()
}
)
SQL Injection
// ❌ VULNERABLE - String interpolation
const user = await db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${id}'`).first()
// ✅ SECURE - Parameterized query
const user = await db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(id).first()
Authentication Checks
// Check: Is auth middleware applied to protected routes?
// Check: Are JWT secrets properly configured?
// Check: Is token expiration validated?
// ❌ MISSING AUTH
app.get('/admin/users', async (c) => { ... })
// ✅ AUTH APPLIED
app.use('/admin/*', authMiddleware)
app.get('/admin/users', async (c) => { ... })
Sensitive Data Exposure
// ❌ EXPOSING SENSITIVE DATA
app.get('/users/:id', async (c) => {
const user = await getUser(id)
return c.json(user) // Returns password hash!
})
// ✅ FILTERED RESPONSE
app.get('/users/:id', async (c) => {
const user = await getUser(id)
const { password, ...safeUser } = user
return c.json(safeUser)
})
CORS Configuration
// ❌ OVERLY PERMISSIVE
app.use('*', cors()) // Allows all origins!
// ✅ RESTRICTED
app.use('*', cors({
origin: ['https://myapp.com', 'https://admin.myapp.com'],
allowMethods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE'],
allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'],
credentials: true,
}))
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 280 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A fa751b584142
hono-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository smicolon/ai-kit (6 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 1,792 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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