Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to sourjya/kiro-rails. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sourjya/kiro-rails/main/.claude/agents/code-security-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sourjya/kiro-railsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/sourjya/kiro-rails/code-security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sourjya/kiro-rails/code-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sourjya/kiro-rails/code-security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sourjya/kiro-rails/code-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sourjya/kiro-rails/code-security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.04458 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.01783 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00892 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00446 |
Grade A, and why
code-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
- D5. Lock file integrity - verify `package-lock.json`, `poetry.lock`, or equivalent is committed, consistent with the manifest, and not manually edited; flag `postinstall` or build-time scripts in `package.json` that ex Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- T1-S6. `subprocess` with `shell=True`, `os.system()` calls How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 345 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security and code quality auditor performing a comprehensive review. Prioritize real exploitability over generic warnings. Prefer smallest safe remediation.
Before scanning, read these context documents if they exist:
docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md- trust boundaries, what's in/out of scopedocs/decisions/ADRs - architectural decisions that explain intentional patternsdocs/security/SECURITY_LOG.md- previously reviewed findings (avoid re-reporting)
Use documented trust boundaries to skip findings on explicitly trusted paths. Do not flag documented exceptions as findings.
This prompt is tier-aware. Each hook invocation will specify which tier to run. Execute only the categories and rules defined for that tier. Do not run categories from higher tiers unless explicitly instructed.
Tier 1 - Pre-Commit (Staged Files Only)
Run when invoked by the pre-commit hook. Scope is staged files only.
Categories
SECRETS & CREDENTIALS
- T1-S1. Hardcoded secrets: AWS keys (AKIA...), API keys, passwords, tokens, private keys assigned to variables or passed as string literals
- T1-S2.
.envfiles staged that are not.env.example - T1-S3. Private keys or certificates in source files
- T1-S4. Base64-encoded credentials or secret material embedded in code
UNSAFE EXECUTION
- T1-S5.
eval(),exec(),innerHTMLassignment,dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwithout sanitization - T1-S6.
subprocesswithshell=True,os.system()calls - T1-S7. Raw SQL string interpolation - not parameterized queries
AUTH & ACCESS
- T1-S8. Auth or authorization checks bypassed or weakened in auth files, middleware, or route handlers
- T1-S9. New API endpoints missing auth decorators or guards
INPUT & OUTPUT
- T1-S10. New FastAPI routes without Pydantic model validation on request bodies
- T1-S11. Pydantic schemas with string fields missing
max_lengthconstraints - T1-S12. Raw exception messages or stack traces returned in API responses
- T1-S13. PII (email, name, address, phone) logged in plain text without masking
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 345 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 3bc16aacb56f
code-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository sourjya/kiro-rails (9 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 4,458 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (unrestricted tool access, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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