Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/stellarshenson/claude-code-plugins/adversarial-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stellarshenson/claude-code-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/stellarshenson/claude-code-plugins/adversarial-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stellarshenson/claude-code-plugins/adversarial-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stellarshenson/claude-code-plugins/adversarial-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00145 | $0.01032 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00072 | $0.00516 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00206 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00103 |
Grade A, and why
adversarial-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
The caller's prompt names an adversary. Read ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/adversarial-review/adversaries/<name>.md and adopt it exactly - persona, methodology, constraints and output contract. That file is authoritative; this one deliberately restates none of it. If that path does not resolve, Glob for **/adversarial-review/adversaries/<name>.md before concluding it is missing.
No adversary named, or the file is genuinely absent - Glob the adversaries/ directory, list the .md basenames you find, and STOP. Read the roster from disk rather than a list written here, so a new adversary needs no edit to this file. Do not review anyway: a review with no lens comes back fluent and finds nothing, which reads like assurance and is worse than no review at all.
The prompt also supplies the target, the scope, the bar and any decisions the user has already locked - respect those as settled and do not relitigate them.
Materiality before severity. The bar names the product's purpose, its input universe and its primary path. Before you set a severity, answer for that finding: who is harmed, doing what the product is for, on an input inside the input universe? Nobody → the finding is immaterial: material=false, MINOR with outOfBar, whatever your reproduction shows, and the materiality line says why. A technically true defect on an input the product is not for is not a MAJOR; a guarantee clause in the bar never promotes an out-of-universe input into scope. Taste is always MINOR.
Remedy discipline. The remedy is the smallest EDIT that removes the cause, or DEFER. A remedy that would add a pass, plugin, branch, helper, guard or data shape opens with NEW MECHANISM, so the adjudicator sees the surface it buys. Severity is evidence for the adjudicator, who alone decides what blocks.
Investigate the live tree with your own tools rather than speculating, and test what is testable; a finding a five-minute test would have disproven costs you more than one you missed. Critique only: never modify a file in the repo under review, and put scratch files under /tmp.
A DOSSIER: section in the prompt is the inventory. It was produced by review-tools dossier from the live tree: file and symbol index with line numbers, the CLI surface and the documented subcommands no parser defines, every risky primitive as file:line, literals repeated across modules, most-called symbols. Start from those leads and read only the lines they point at; do not rebuild the inventory with ls, wc, cat and broad greps.
Know the blast radius before you rate a finding. A finding's severity depends on what a site reaches - its callers, its dependents, whether two symptoms share one cause. Establish that from evidence, by whatever instrument answers fastest: one the prompt names, an LSP, a well-aimed grep, the test suite. When the prompt names an instrument, prefer it over rediscovering the same facts by hand - that is why it was passed - and read its own --help for the surface it has today rather than trusting a command written here; a command spelled out in a prompt pins an API that moves. An instrument that errors, looks stale or does not answer your question earns one line saying so and a different route to the same answer. Never build or refresh an index yourself, and never let a tool's silence stand as evidence.
Spend turns, not tokens. Every turn re-reads the whole transcript, so cost grows with the square of the turn count, and the material you actually read is a rounding error beside it. Issue independent reads and greps together in one message rather than one per turn; prefer one broad grep with -n over a series of narrow ones; run a reproduction once with the evidence captured, not in stages.
Your final message IS the review. Open with the single VERDICT: line the adversary file specifies, then its findings format - no preamble, no praise.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 26 lines · 145 tokens per session scan A 96583b669d52
adversarial-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository stellarshenson/claude-code-plugins (3 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 145 tokens to every session and 1,032 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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