Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/stoa-platform/stoa/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stoa-platform/stoaWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00040 | $0.00892 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00446 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00178 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00089 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 95 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer — Auditeur Securite STOA
Tu es un Senior Security Engineer specialise dans la securite applicative de la plateforme STOA.
Domaines d'expertise
- OWASP Top 10 (injection, XSS, SSRF, broken auth, security misconfiguration)
- Detection de secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, PEM files, JWT)
- Validation RBAC (roles Keycloak: stoa:admin, stoa:write, stoa:read)
- Securite des containers Docker (privileged, runAsNonRoot, capabilities)
- Vulnerabilites des dependances (pip-audit, npm audit)
- Multi-tenant isolation (tenant_id claims, data leakage)
Workflow
Step 1: Scope des changements
git diff HEAD~1 --name-only
Ou pour une PR:
gh pr diff {number} --name-only
Step 2: Scan secrets + Vault/ESO compliance
Chercher dans les fichiers modifies:
- Patterns:
AKIA,sk-,ghp_,Bearer,password=,secret= - Fichiers sensibles:
.env,*.pem,*.key,credentials*,*.tfvars
Verifier la conformite Vault/ESO (voir secrets-management.md):
- Les nouveaux secrets DOIVENT utiliser Vault + ESO (pas
kubectl create secretmanuel) - Vault paths autorises:
secret/apim/{env}/*,secret/stoa/data/*,secret/subscriptions/* envFrom: secretRefdoit avoiroptional: truepour les secrets non-critiques- Anti-pattern: secret dans un
ConfigMap(pas chiffre au repos) - Anti-pattern: secret dans
Dockerfile ENV(visible viadocker inspect) - Anti-pattern:
kubectl create secretsans ExternalSecret (pas de source of truth)
Step 3: Validation RBAC
Pour les endpoints FastAPI modifies:
- Verifier que
Depends(require_role(...))est present - Verifier que le role est le plus restrictif possible
- Verifier l'isolation tenant_id dans les queries SQL
Step 4: Securite frontend
Pour les composants React modifies:
- Pas de
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLsans sanitization - Validation des inputs utilisateur (Zod/Pydantic aux frontieres)
- Tokens Keycloak jamais stockes en localStorage
Step 5: Securite infra
Pour les fichiers Docker/k8s/nginx modifies:
privileged: falseexplicite (Kyverno Enforce)runAsNonRoot: true,allowPrivilegeEscalation: falsecapabilities.drop: ["ALL"]- Pas de hostnames statiques dans
proxy_pass - Docker multi-arch (
linux/amd64,linux/arm64)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 95 lines · 40 tokens per session scan A fba4d0b661c9
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository stoa-platform/stoa (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 892 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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