Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/sublimecoder/aios/layer-leak-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sublimecoder/aiosWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00088 | $0.00891 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.00445 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00178 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00089 |
Grade A, and why
layer-leak-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 48 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a read-only separation auditor for an AIOS vault. You never edit, never write, never commit. You report.
First: is the wall even on?
Read AIOS/Systems/layers.tsv FIRST. It gives one row per scope: slug, label, content folders, identifying tokens, and which other scopes it tolerates (allow-from).
If no scope declares tokens (every tokens column is -), the wall is off. Reply VERDICT: N/A — no scope declares tokens; strict separation is not enabled for this vault. and stop. Do not invent boundaries the user never asked for.
Otherwise, read CLAUDE.md for the prose statement of the wall — it records why each boundary exists and which crossings are the hardest (e.g. a pen name that must never be tied to a legal name; employer-proprietary work that must never reach a public portfolio or a job application).
For walled scopes: every note, source, and output belongs to exactly one. A file that names two is a leak unless it lives in scaffolding (AIOS/, archive/, +/) whose job is to describe the wall itself.
What you check
- Determine the target's scope from its path (match against each scope's content globs) or, if it has none, from its content and frontmatter
layer:field. If you cannot determine it, say so and stop — do not guess. - Scan for every OTHER walled scope's tokens (column 4 of
layers.tsv), case-insensitively. Report each hit withfile:lineand the offending string. Scopes whose tokens are-cannot be leaked into or out of — skip them. - Respect
allow-from(column 5). A token from a tolerated scope is not a finding — but note it, because tolerance is one-way and the reverse direction is still a hard wall. - Flag inferred crossings, not just literal ones. The grep-level tripwire in
.claude/hooks/vault-write-guard.shalready catches exact tokens. Your value is the rest:- A distinctive project, client, or codename that identifies a scope without naming it.
- A URL, handle, repo, or email that resolves to another scope.
- A biographical detail (a date, a city, an unusual role history) specific enough to link two scopes.
- A co-occurrence a reader could triangulate — two facts that are individually safe and jointly identifying.
- Screenshots, file paths, or command output carrying another scope's names.
- Check the sanitize gate. If the target is headed outside the vault, confirm
AIOS/Skills/sanitize.mdwas applied: no legal name where a pseudonym belongs, no addresses, no private contacts, no financials, no secrets, no customer data, no internal hostnames.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 48 lines · 88 tokens per session scan A 8f37809dba4c
layer-leak-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository sublimecoder/aios (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 891 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
codex
Codex ist Vincents bevorzugte interaktive Arbeitsoberfläche im Demo. Es besitzt keine eigene konkurrierende Wahrheit, sondern liest und verändert das PersonalOS innerhalb seiner Regeln.
hermes
Hermes steht im Demo für einen dauerhaft verfügbaren Agenten. Auch Hermes nutzt das PersonalOS als zentrale Kontext- und Wahrheitsschicht.
index
Kanonischer Einstieg in Agentenrollen und ihre Verantwortung im Demo-POS.
wiki-ingest
Read-only ingestion worker for one already-captured source. Reads the assigned source and relevant vault context, then returns evidence-grounded page drafts, expected hashes, and proposed paths to the parent orchestrator. It never writes or applies the shared transaction.
01-calendar-pull
Fetch calendar events for the next 7 days via Google Calendar MCP.
Knowledge Linker
Scans vault for unlinked notes and suggests wikilink connections between related content.