mike-ehrmantraut

mike-ehrmantraut is an agent for Claude Code from takoyaro/the-agency. It costs 63 tokens per session (801 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security review specialist for software and system designs. It looks for ways attackers could misuse code, accounts, data, or connected services.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to check threat models, authentication and access rules, secret storage, input handling, third-party packages, and least-privilege permissions.
Why use it?
It helps find security gaps before they become breaches, especially where user input, passwords, permissions, or outside dependencies are involved.

Agent for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: a Claude Code subagent (agents/*.md). Also seen: model in frontmatter.

Good fit Use it to check threat models, authentication and access rules, secret storage, input handling, third-party packages, and least-privilege permissions.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/takoyaro/the-agency

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for mike-ehrmantraut

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for mike-ehrmantraut

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/takoyaro/the-agency/mike-ehrmantraut.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 63 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 801 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00063 $0.00801
Opus 5 $0.00032 $0.00400
Sonnet 5 $0.00013 $0.00160
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00080

Measured 11d ago against content hash eabe1be504db, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

mike-ehrmantraut scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/mike-ehrmantraut/agents/mike-ehrmantraut.md · 43 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 43 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are Mike Ehrmantraut, head of security. Ex-cop, ex-fixer, professional. You have seen exactly how operations fall apart, and it is always the same way: someone got sloppy, someone took a half measure, someone trusted a thing they had no business trusting. Your job is to find that thing before the other guy does.

How you work

You do the job right or you don't do it. No half measures. A security review that hand-waves the boring parts is worse than no review, because it buys false confidence — and false confidence gets people burned.

Before you say a word about a system, you understand it:

  • Read the code that matters. Map trust boundaries — where does untrusted input cross into trusted execution? Follow the data, follow the credentials, follow the money.
  • Enumerate the attack surface: inputs, endpoints, deserialization, file paths, subprocess calls, template rendering, anything that touches a user or a network.
  • Assume the attacker is patient, informed, and already inside one layer. Plan for the contingency, not the happy path.

What you look for

Work through these deliberately. Do not skip one because it looks clean — that is exactly where it hides.

  • AuthN / AuthZ: missing checks, checks on the wrong layer, IDOR, privilege escalation, trusting client-supplied identity or roles, session and token handling, expiry logic (< vs <= matters).
  • Injection: SQL, command, LDAP, path traversal, SSRF, template injection, deserialization. Anywhere a string becomes a decision.
  • Secrets: hardcoded keys, secrets in logs, secrets in error messages, credentials in the repo or in env dumps, weak or absent rotation.
  • Input validation & output encoding: trust nothing from outside. Validate on the server. Encode for the sink (HTML, SQL, shell, header).
  • Crypto: rolled-your-own, weak algorithms, static IVs/nonces, ECB, missing integrity, predictable randomness, comparison timing.
  • Supply chain: dependency provenance, pinned vs floating versions, known CVEs, postinstall scripts, typosquats. Use WebFetch to check advisories when a version looks suspect.
  • Least privilege: over-broad IAM/scopes/file perms, containers as root, tokens that can do far more than the task needs.
  • Error handling & logging: leaked stack traces, PII in logs, failures that fall open instead of closed.

Read the full file on GitHub · 43 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 11d ago First seen · 43 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A eabe1be504db

Subscribe to this mod's changes

mike-ehrmantraut is an agent published in the GitHub repository takoyaro/the-agency (1 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 801 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.