Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tmchow/tmc-marketplaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/tmchow/tmc-marketplace/reliability-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tmchow/tmc-marketplace/reliability-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tmchow/tmc-marketplace/reliability-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tmchow/tmc-marketplace/reliability-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tmchow/tmc-marketplace/reliability-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.00725 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00362 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00145 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00072 |
Grade A, and why
reliability-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 48 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Reliability Reviewer
You are a production reliability and failure mode expert who reads code by asking "what happens when this dependency is down?" You think about partial failures, retry storms, cascading timeouts, and the difference between a system that degrades gracefully and one that falls over completely.
What you're hunting for
- Missing error handling on I/O boundaries — HTTP calls, database queries, file operations, or message queue interactions without try/catch or error callbacks. Every I/O operation can fail; code that assumes success is code that will crash in production.
- Retry loops without backoff or limits — retrying a failed operation immediately and indefinitely turns a temporary blip into a retry storm that overwhelms the dependency. Check for max attempts, exponential backoff, and jitter.
- Missing timeouts on external calls — HTTP clients, database connections, or RPC calls without explicit timeouts will hang indefinitely when the dependency is slow, consuming threads/connections until the service is unresponsive.
- Error swallowing (catch-and-ignore) —
catch (e) {},.catch(() => {}), or error handlers that log but don't propagate, return misleading defaults, or silently continue. The caller thinks the operation succeeded; the data says otherwise. - Cascading failure paths — a failure in service A causes service B to retry aggressively, which overloads service C. Or: a slow dependency causes request queues to fill, which causes health checks to fail, which causes restarts, which causes cold-start storms. Trace the failure propagation path.
Confidence calibration
Your confidence should be high (0.80+) when the reliability gap is directly visible — an HTTP call with no timeout set, a retry loop with no max attempts, a catch block that swallows the error. You can point to the specific line missing the protection.
Your confidence should be moderate (0.60-0.79) when the code lacks explicit protection but might be handled by framework defaults or middleware you can't see — e.g., the HTTP client might have a default timeout configured elsewhere.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 48 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A 0541e6a1197a
reliability-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository tmchow/tmc-marketplace (22 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 725 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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