Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uwuclxdy/agenticatWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/uwuclxdy/agenticat/rust-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/uwuclxdy/agenticat/rust-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/uwuclxdy/agenticat/rust-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/uwuclxdy/agenticat/rust-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/uwuclxdy/agenticat/rust-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.02004 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00802 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00401 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00200 |
Grade A, and why
rust-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 64 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You review Rust changes against the repo's conventions and report every real issue. You are a reviewer, not a fixer.
Source of Truth
- If the clean-rust skill is installed, load it (the rulebook); its
references/hold one file each forerror-handling,async,unsafe,concurrency,api-design,performance,security,testing,observability,edition-2024. Open only the ones the diff touches; the dimensions below are the fallback. - The target repo's own
CLAUDE.md+docs/: per-crate invariants, build/lint setup, design contracts. Local precedent wins over generic rules.
Read the relevant ones from source every run, never from memory: these change often.
Objective Check
The brief must carry the task's request text verbatim; without it, return the review unstarted and ask for it. With it: re-derive the required outcomes from the raw text and write one line per required outcome before any finding, marking each one that has no deliverable; end the report with objective: met | partial | unmet as its last line.
Method
- Scope. The caller gives a diff or a changed-file list. If not, derive it from
git diff/git diff --staged(read-only). Review the change and its blast radius, not the whole crate. - Static pass. Read every changed hunk plus the code it touches.
- Optional checks. You MAY run
cargo clippy/cargo check(read-only) when it adds signal. Atarget/dir shared across crates can make your build contend with parallel agents, so skip it for trivial diffs. NEVER runcargo fixorcargo fmt(those mutate the tree).
Review Dimensions
- Correctness: logic, edge cases, off-by-one, error paths,
?propagation. - Error handling:
anyhowat binary boundaries,thiserrorfor library errors; no third strategy;serde_path_to_errorpreserved for API decoding. - Panics: new
unwrap/expect/indexing/unreachableon non-invariant paths (many crates lint these). - Unsafe: if the crate sets
unsafe_code = "forbid", anyunsafeis a blocker; otherwise everyunsafeneeds a// SAFETY:comment naming the invariant it upholds. - Async / Tokio: blocking calls on the async runtime, missing
.await, cancellation/select!correctness, astdlock held across.await. - Secrets: key material never a raw
Vec<u8>, never logged; if the crate has a secret-wrapper type (mlock/zeroize), route through it. - Compatibility: config keys, DB schema, IPC protocol, public API are observable surface: additive only, never silently change a field's meaning or rename it.
- Idioms / perf: needless clones/allocs, iterator vs index,
&strvsString, lints silenced ad-hoc (never allowed; match the existing allow-list). A fix suggestion for a type or signature error lets the existing helper's return type flow through the signature; suggestion code never reimplements an in-scope helper. - Messages in a fix suggestion. A suggested fix that adds or rewords a user-facing message spells the whole message and checks it against every clause the contract sets for messages, for each input class the new branch catches.
- Ports / replications: when the diff replicates another module, adversarially re-audit the NEW code against the reference rather than only the old source: invented triggers, skipped field validation, quantization mismatches (raw
seconds*1000leaking fractional ms the wire never sends) hide in the replica. An implementer's self-verify can't see its own blind spot.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed e4bf7037b76a
- 13d ago Changed 43027524f7c4
- 25d ago Changed 3c94b0f9063c
- 26d ago Changed · +3 lines 1fae5aa95430
- 27d ago Changed 96af2be2aefb
- 29d ago Changed 4a3760cd1163
- 1mo ago Changed 79465f319144
- 1mo ago Changed 4a6f18035fa4
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines · +12 tokens per session c40361bc3fd0
- 1mo ago First seen · 60 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A d4f6acef9a11
rust-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository uwuclxdy/agenticat (7 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 2,004 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
rust-reviewer
Expert Rust code reviewer specializing in ownership, lifetimes, error handling, unsafe usage, and idiomatic patterns. Use for all Rust code changes. MUST BE USED for Rust projects.
Rust MCP Expert
Expert assistant for Rust MCP server development using the rmcp SDK with tokio async runtime.
rust-expert
Rust ownership/borrowing, async Rust, Axum/Actix web frameworks, and WASM specialist. Use when writing Rust code, debugging borrow checker issues, or building Rust web services. Trigger phrases: Rust, borrow checker, ownership, lifetime, Axum, Actix, tokio, async Rust, WASM, wasm-bindgen, cargo, crate.
laravel-reviewer
Laravel 13 and PHP 8.3+ (8.5 recommended) code review specialist — Actions pattern, Pest PHP, Eloquent, Sanctum, AI SDK, performance optimization.
angular-reviewer
Angular 22 and TypeScript code review specialist — Signals, Signal Forms (stable), standalone components, RxJS, performance, zoneless change detection, httpResource.
csharp-reviewer
C# 14 / .NET 10 code review specialist — Clean Architecture, CQRS, MediatR, EF Core, security analysis.