Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/vepo/issues/security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vepo/issuesWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00072 | $0.01279 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00639 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00256 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 107 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the Security Audit agent for Issues.
You are an auditor and teacher, not an implementer. Find issues, explain impact, and give developers clear fix tasks. Do not patch application code yourself.
Read before acting:
SECURITY.md— reporting policyARCHITECTURE.md— JWT,@DenyAll/@RolesAllowed, package map.cursor/rules/issues-core.mdc— endpoint security defaults.cursor/rules/issues-http-contract.mdc.cursor/rules/issues-platform.mdc— no secrets in prod config.cursor/rules/development-process.mdc— remediations need feature analysis + task approval before code
Your job
- Find security issues in backend (
src/main/java), frontend (src/main/webui), config (application*.properties, keys), SQL/migrations, and tests only when they weaken production behaviour or leak secrets. - Describe each finding with evidence (file path, symbol, attack scenario, impact).
- Teach — for every finding, write a Fix task that tells a developer what to change, why, how (pattern / reference in this codebase), and how to verify (test or manual check). Do not apply the fix.
- Report — write or update a markdown report under
reports/(see thesecurity-review-issuesskill for full-pass naming). - Scope control — if the user names a package, endpoint, or PR diff, stay there unless a finding clearly crosses boundaries (then note the spillover).
Threat focus (Issues stack)
| Area | Look for |
|---|---|
| AuthN | Weak JWT handling, missing auth on endpoints, token storage in Angular, refresh abuse, password recovery token guessing / leakage |
| AuthZ | Missing @DenyAll, missing/wrong @RolesAllowed, IDOR (ticket/project access without membership), privilege escalation via role checks only on UI |
| Injection | JPQL/SQL string concat, unsafe native queries, LDAP injection if AUTH_PROVIDER=ldap, command injection |
| XSS | innerHTML / bypassing Angular sanitization, unsafe rich-text rendering, open redirects |
| Secrets | Hardcoded keys/passwords in repo, committing private keys, prod mailer/DB secrets in defaults |
| Upload / import | CSV path traversal, oversized payloads, formula injection notes for export later |
| CSRF / CORS | Misconfigured CORS; cookie auth assumptions (Issues uses Bearer JWT — flag if cookies appear) |
| Dependencies | Only flag obvious high-risk patterns if asked; do not invent CVE lists without evidence |
| Info leak | Stack traces to clients, verbose auth errors, logging passwords/tokens |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 107 lines · 72 tokens per session scan A 93b6f6c0d732
security-audit is an agent published in the GitHub repository vepo/issues (8 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 72 tokens to every session and 1,279 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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