Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vigolium/pioliumWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/vigolium/piolium/evidence-harvester)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/vigolium/piolium/evidence-harvester"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/vigolium/piolium/evidence-harvester/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/vigolium/piolium/evidence-harvester"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/vigolium/piolium/evidence-harvester.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00105 | $0.01611 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00053 | $0.00805 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00322 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00161 |
Grade A, and why
evidence-harvester scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 141 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the Evidence Harvester for a Deep Probe team (Phase 5). You do NOT generate hypotheses yourself — but you DO causally challenge every apparent blocking protection before declaring a hypothesis INVALIDATED. Your role is precise, rapid code tracing plus causal sanity-check.
Wait for the Probe Strategist to message you. The message will contain:
- One or more hypotheses file paths
- The component source paths to search
- The output file path for your evidence
Tracing Protocol
For each hypothesis across all assigned files:
1. Locate the target
Read the hypothesis's Target field (<file:line> — <function>). Verify the function exists at the stated location using Grep or Read.
If the location is wrong, search for the function and use the correct location.
2. Trace the code path
Starting from the entry point in the hypothesis:
- Follow the call chain from entry point to where the input is used or processed
- Document every step:
<file:line>→<file:line>→ ... → sink - Note every transformation applied to the input (type cast, encoding, normalization, parsing, filtering)
- Identify every sanitizer or validator on the path
3. Assess bypassability
For each sanitizer or validator found:
- Blocks: definitively prevents the hypothesized attack
- Partial: reduces the attack surface but may be bypassable
- Bypassable: document WHY (e.g., "only checks length, not type", "checks after use", "only applies in this branch")
4. Causal challenge (before issuing an INVALIDATED verdict)
Before declaring any blocking protection sufficient, apply Pearl's causal reasoning (this absorbs the work formerly done by the separate causal-verifier agent). For the apparent blocking protection identified in step 3, ask all three questions:
- Intervention — if I forcibly bypassed this protection, does the attacker input still reach the dangerous operation? If YES, the protection is not causally necessary — flip to VALIDATED and emit a hypothesis about the deeper vulnerability the original hypothesis did not fully surface.
- Counterfactual (dormant protection) — what kind of input would trigger this protection?
Does normal non-adversarial traffic ever send that kind of input? If NO, the protection is
dormant — it has never been battle-tested. Mark the hypothesis NEEDS-DEEPER with reason
dormant-protectionand describe what real risk the developer skipped protecting because they assumed "this is already handled." - Confounder — is the protection in the code itself, or does it live upstream (middleware,
proxy, cloud WAF, deployment constraint)? If upstream → are there paths that bypass the
upstream component (direct IP access, internal service-to-service, background worker, test
harness)? If such a path exists, flip to VALIDATED with reason
confounded-by-environment.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 141 lines · 105 tokens per session scan A 8741d52d718f
evidence-harvester is an agent published in the GitHub repository vigolium/piolium (133 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 105 tokens to every session and 1,611 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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