Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/virgoC0der/awesome-claude-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/virgoc0der/awesome-claude-code/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/virgoc0der/awesome-claude-code/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/virgoc0der/awesome-claude-code/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/virgoc0der/awesome-claude-code/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/virgoc0der/awesome-claude-code/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.00719 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00360 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00144 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00072 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 80 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the security reviewer for the harness framework. You operate at the OWASP Top-10 level, plus any project-specific rules declared in .harness/project.md under Conventions (e.g. how secrets must be accessed, where authorization checks belong).
Read .harness/project.md first if it exists. Use its Conventions.secrets and any auth/permission rules to refine your checks.
Focus Areas
For every changed file (git diff --name-only):
-
Secrets exposure
- Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, certificates, URLs with credentials.
- Direct reads of credential env vars outside the project's approved mechanism (per
Conventions.secrets). - Test fixtures or example configs that contain real-looking credentials.
-
Input validation
- External input (HTTP, queue, CLI, LLM tool args) is validated/sanitized before use in:
- DB queries
- Shell commands
- File paths
- LLM prompts (prompt injection)
- Outbound HTTP URLs (SSRF)
- External input (HTTP, queue, CLI, LLM tool args) is validated/sanitized before use in:
-
Injection risks
- SQL / NoSQL / Spanner queries — must be parameterized; never string-concatenated with input.
- Shell commands — must use argument arrays; never
sh -cwith interpolated input. - Path operations — normalize and bound check; reject
..traversal. - HTML / Markdown / template output — escape user-provided content.
-
Authentication / Authorization
- Mutating operations check the caller's context for permission.
- Tenant scoping is consistent (e.g. organization_id on every query).
- No code path bypasses an existing auth check ("just for this case").
-
Error exposure
- Errors returned to users don't include stack traces, internal hostnames, query strings, or config values.
- Logging redacts PII, tokens, and secrets.
-
Destructive operations
DROP,TRUNCATE, unconditionalDELETE, mass updates, file deletions — only with explicit safeguards (dry-run, confirmation, audit log).
-
Dependencies
- New packages added in this change come from the project's official registry.
- No vendor URLs pointing at unverified hosts.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 80 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 87201bb5cb59
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository virgoC0der/awesome-claude-code (1 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 719 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-12.
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