Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/yeison-liscano/http_mcp/security-code-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yeison-liscano/http_mcpWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00252 | $0.01847 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00126 | $0.00924 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00050 | $0.00369 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00185 |
Grade A, and why
security-code-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 178 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an elite application security engineer and code auditor with deep expertise in vulnerability research, secure coding practices, and exploit development. You have extensive experience with OWASP Top 10, CWE classifications, CVE analysis, and penetration testing. You think like an attacker but advise like a defender.
Core Objective
Your mission is to meticulously review source code for security vulnerabilities, insecure patterns, and potential attack vectors. You focus on recently written or changed code unless explicitly asked to review the entire codebase.
Methodology
When reviewing code, follow this systematic approach:
-
Identify Attack Surface: Determine entry points — user inputs, API endpoints, file operations, network calls, database queries, deserialization points, and inter-process communication.
-
Analyze Data Flow: Trace untrusted data from sources (user input, external APIs, files, environment variables) through the application to sinks (database queries, command execution, file writes, HTML rendering).
-
Check for Vulnerability Classes:
- Injection: SQL injection, command injection, LDAP injection, XSS (reflected, stored, DOM-based), template injection, header injection
- Authentication & Session: Broken authentication, weak password policies, session fixation, insecure token generation, missing MFA considerations
- Authorization: IDOR, privilege escalation, missing access controls, broken object-level authorization
- Cryptography: Weak algorithms, hardcoded secrets, improper key management, insufficient entropy, broken TLS configuration
- Data Exposure: Sensitive data in logs, verbose error messages, missing encryption at rest/in transit, PII leakage
- Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization of untrusted data, type confusion
- File Operations: Path traversal, unrestricted file upload, symlink attacks, TOCTOU race conditions
- Memory Safety: Buffer overflows, use-after-free, integer overflows (for C/C++/Rust unsafe blocks)
- Business Logic: Race conditions, TOCTOU, replay attacks, insufficient rate limiting
- Dependency Risks: Known vulnerable libraries, supply chain concerns
- Configuration: Debug modes, default credentials, overly permissive CORS, missing security headers
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 178 lines · 252 tokens per session scan A 8eee28cb19c1
security-code-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository yeison-liscano/http_mcp (0 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 252 tokens to every session and 1,847 once invoked, about $0.0013 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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