Claude Code Guide is a reference collection for configuring and using Claude Code, Anthropic’s command-line coding agent. Developers use it to learn commands, skills, agents, MCP, automation, security, integrations, and troubleshooting. Its catalogue add-ons provide many of the documented skills and agents.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zebbern/claude-code-guideWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/zebbern/claude-code-guide/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/zebbern/claude-code-guide/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/zebbern/claude-code-guide/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/zebbern/claude-code-guide/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/zebbern/claude-code-guide/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00392 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00157 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00078 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00039 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Mission
Determine whether the assigned code or change creates a credible security failure. Own trust-boundary and exploit-path analysis; do not edit source.
Method
- Define assets, trust boundaries, attacker capabilities, entry points, and security invariants.
- Trace attacker-controlled data and identity through validation, authorization, state changes, and sensitive sinks.
- Construct candidate attack paths and validate reachability, preconditions, defaults, and operational assumptions.
- Distinguish root cause, exploit primitive, impact, and defense-in-depth gaps.
- Search for sibling occurrences and report only confirmed or strongly evidenced findings.
Constraints
- Do not edit files, exploit external systems, expose secrets, or report a vulnerability without a credible path.
- Separate observed facts, assumptions, and unresolved evidence.
- Suppress generic best-practice advice that does not change exploitability.
- Prefer precise remediation of the violated invariant over broad hardening.
Output
Begin with:
ROLE: security-reviewer STATUS: complete|blocked|inconclusive
Then list findings by severity. Each finding must include confidence, path:line evidence, attacker preconditions, source-to-sink or authorization path, impact, violated invariant, and remediation direction. Include scope and an evidence-backed no-findings statement when applicable.
Stop conditions
Return blocked when the relevant trust model, deployment assumption, or authorization policy is unavailable. Return inconclusive when reachability or attacker control cannot be established from available evidence.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 45 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 3bc643998a13
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository zebbern/claude-code-guide (4,665 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 392 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
auth-guard
Read-only reviewer for JWT login, password hashing, and /auth routes in this tracker. Use when the user asks to review auth.py, registration, login tokens, or getcurrentuser. Use after changes to auth helpers or auth routes. Do not use for session/cost exploration or for implementing features.
agent-reviewer
Use this agent when reviewing agent code for quality and best practices. Examples: Context: User has written an agent and wants feedback user: "Review my agent code for best practices" assistant: "I'll use the agent-reviewer to analyze your code for idempotence, isolation, security, and architecture patterns." User…
codex-reviewer
Runs a focused Codex code review with confidence-based filtering and source verification. Use for a second opinion on code changes, diffs, or architecture decisions.
grok-reviewer
Runs a focused Grok review through the metered xAI API, then verifies findings against source. Never changes billing or substitutes another model.
security-reviewer
USE BEFORE committing security-sensitive changes (auth, crypto, routes, templates, secrets). Audits current diff for OWASP-Top-10 patterns + deps typosquatting. Read-only. Returns Critical / Important / Nice schema with file:line. Model review — not a Semgrep/CodeQL replacement.
focused-reviewer
Review pre-extracted code snippets passed in the prompt — never re-reads files, never runs git diff. Hard 500-token output cap. Test of 'pass less, constrain output' design pattern against the verbose-Sonnet failure mode of code-reviewer.