Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/landim32/awesome-ai-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/landim32/awesome-ai-skills/speckit.plan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/landim32/awesome-ai-skills/speckit.plan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/landim32/awesome-ai-skills/speckit.plan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/landim32/awesome-ai-skills/speckit.plan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/landim32/awesome-ai-skills/speckit.plan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00014 | $0.01430 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00715 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00286 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00143 |
Grade A, and why
speckit.plan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
97% identical to speckit.plan — 4 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 154 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
User Input
$ARGUMENTS
You MUST consider the user input before proceeding (if not empty).
Pre-Execution Checks
Check for extension hooks (before planning):
- Check if
.specify/extensions.ymlexists in the project root. - If it exists, read it and look for entries under the
hooks.before_plankey - If the YAML cannot be parsed or is invalid, skip hook checking silently and continue normally
- Filter out hooks where
enabledis explicitlyfalse. Treat hooks without anenabledfield as enabled by default. - For each remaining hook, do not attempt to interpret or evaluate hook
conditionexpressions:- If the hook has no
conditionfield, or it is null/empty, treat the hook as executable - If the hook defines a non-empty
condition, skip the hook and leave condition evaluation to the HookExecutor implementation
- If the hook has no
- For each executable hook, output the following based on its
optionalflag:- Optional hook (
optional: true):## Extension Hooks **Optional Pre-Hook**: {extension} Command: `/{command}` Description: {description} Prompt: {prompt} To execute: `/{command}` - Mandatory hook (
optional: false):## Extension Hooks **Automatic Pre-Hook**: {extension} Executing: `/{command}` EXECUTE_COMMAND: {command} Wait for the result of the hook command before proceeding to the Outline.
- Optional hook (
- If no hooks are registered or
.specify/extensions.ymldoes not exist, skip silently
Outline
-
Setup: Run
.specify/scripts/powershell/setup-plan.ps1 -Jsonfrom repo root and parse JSON for FEATURE_SPEC, IMPL_PLAN, SPECS_DIR, BRANCH. For single quotes in args like "I'm Groot", use escape syntax: e.g 'I'''m Groot' (or double-quote if possible: "I'm Groot"). -
Load context: Read FEATURE_SPEC and
.specify/memory/constitution.md. Load IMPL_PLAN template (already copied). -
Execute plan workflow: Follow the structure in IMPL_PLAN template to:
- Fill Technical Context (mark unknowns as "NEEDS CLARIFICATION")
- Fill Constitution Check section from constitution
- Evaluate gates (ERROR if violations unjustified)
- Phase 0: Generate research.md (resolve all NEEDS CLARIFICATION)
- Phase 1: Generate data-model.md, contracts/, quickstart.md
- Phase 1: Update agent context by running the agent script
- Re-evaluate Constitution Check post-design
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 154 lines · 14 tokens per session scan A 0665f84e7558
speckit.plan is a command published in the GitHub repository landim32/awesome-ai-skills (1 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 1,430 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 97% identical to speckit.plan, differing in 4 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
skill-safety
Hostile audit of coding-agent configuration the project installed rather than wrote: skills, subagents, commands, plugins, hooks, and rule files obtained from a marketplace, a git URL, a gist, or a teammate. Assume every installed instruction file is attacker-authored until read, and that the attacker's goal is to be…
cr
Tool-driven implementation of unresolved PR/MR review comments on GitHub, GitLab or Bitbucket: fetch every comment thread plus the out-of-thread notices (review bodies, bot summaries), evaluate each for technical validity, implement valid ones one at a time with a full validation pass after each, and scan the codebase…
_conventions
Read this file before executing any command file. Every rule here applies to every command unless the command file explicitly overrides it.
reliability
Hostile audit of behavior when a dependency fails, a call is retried, or a message is redelivered: assume every retry double-applies, every external call hangs forever, and every crash lands in the worst window — then prove where. A call that is idempotent, bounded, timed-out, and backed-off survives; anything else is…
agent-rules
Audits the project's agent rule configuration end-to-end: validates every rule file, classifies every rule in the root instruction file as correctly placed or misplaced, and generates concrete new-rule suggestions from audit artifacts and project conventions. Assume every rule file has defects until proven otherwise.
cache
Hostile audit of caching correctness: assume every cache serves stale data after a write, shares a key across entities that must not share one, grows without bound, and stampedes on expiry — then prove where. A cache is a correctness liability until its key, its invalidation, its bound, and its expiry behavior are all…