Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-tracegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ogrodev/fsocietyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-trace)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-trace"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-trace.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00808 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00404 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00162 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00081 |
Grade D, and why
op-trace scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- **Login records**: Examine `wtmp`, `btmp`, `lastlog`, `/var/log/auth.log` for entries matching the operator's activity window. Flag any login entries, failed attempts, or sudo usage. Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
- `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for added keys What it actually says
Storage Policy: ALL output files MUST be saved in the project directory. NEVER write to /tmp/ or any system temporary directory.
Trace Scanning and Elimination
Target and options: $ARGUMENTS
-
Parse
$ARGUMENTSfor target host and mode flag (--scan-onlyor--eliminate). Default to--scan-onlyif neither flag is specified. -
Phase 1 — Scan: Check for forensic artifacts across all categories:
-
Login records: Examine
wtmp,btmp,lastlog,/var/log/auth.logfor entries matching the operator's activity window. Flag any login entries, failed attempts, or sudo usage. -
Command history: Search for shell history files:
~/.bash_history~/.zsh_history~/.python_history~/.mysql_history~/.psql_historyFlag any files with recent entries or non-zero size.
-
Temp files: Scan
/tmp/*,/dev/shm/*,/var/tmp/*for files created during the operational window. Flag any files owned by the operator or with suspicious names. -
Cron entries: Check
crontab -lfor current user and root. Scan/etc/cron.*directories and/var/spool/cron/for persistence mechanisms. -
SSH artifacts: Inspect:
~/.ssh/authorized_keysfor added keys~/.ssh/known_hostsfor target entries- Recent SSH connection logs in auth.log
- SSH agent socket files
-
Recent files accessed: Check
~/.local/share/recently-used.xbeland similar desktop tracking files for recently opened files. -
Connection logs: Search for network connection records in logs —
ssoutput snapshots,netstatentries, firewall logs, and/var/log/messagesfor connection-related entries.
-
-
Phase 2 — Report: Present all findings categorized by risk level:
- CRITICAL: Active persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, authorized_keys, running processes)
- HIGH: Login records, command history with operational commands
- MEDIUM: Temp files, SSH known_hosts entries, connection logs
- LOW: Recently-used file trackers, cached data
-
Phase 3 — Eliminate (only if
--eliminateflag is set):- For each trace found, present the artifact to the user and ask for confirmation before removal via
AskUserQuestion - Remove artifacts in order from CRITICAL to LOW severity
- For login records: use
utmpdump/utmpsetor direct binary editing to remove specific entries - For history files: truncate or selectively remove lines
- For temp files: secure-delete with
shredthenrm - For cron entries: remove specific lines from crontab
- For SSH artifacts: remove specific lines from authorized_keys and known_hosts
- Verify each removal was successful
- For each trace found, present the artifact to the user and ask for confirmation before removal via
-
Log all findings to the ops tracker:
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/ops-tracker.js" add <target> trace-scan <category> "<artifact>" <risk-level> <status> -
Write the trace report to the project directory. Include all scanned categories, findings with risk levels, and elimination status if
--eliminatewas used.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 63 lines · 11 tokens per session scan D ebe336bd1ba9
op-trace is a command published in the GitHub repository ogrodev/fsociety (20 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 808 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (asks for root, reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other commands, from other repositories
pentest
Activate pentest mode — displays ASCII art, configures session isolation, collects engagement scope, then OWNS the engagement: pre-flight, recon, planning (via the pentester-orchestrator planner), executor dispatch, a time-budget quota loop, aggregation, and report generation.
pentest-attacks
Define the attack profile for an engagement — select which attack categories and skills to use. Saves to .pentest-attacks.json. If run before /pentest:pentest, the orchestrator will respect the selection. If run standalone, does not launch a pentest.
pentest-kali
Connect to a Metasploit-Kali Server (MKS) REST API — verifies connectivity, discovers available Kali tools, and configures agents to prefer MKS endpoints over local Bash equivalents.
pentest-scope
Define or update engagement scope — saves scope to disk without launching a pentest. Can be run before or during an engagement. If a pentest is active and the target changes drastically, warns the operator and suggests a new engagement.
pentest-exit
Close pentest session — summarizes findings, ensures outputs are saved, lifts isolation, and prompts for /clear.
bb-ad
Active Directory enumeration and attack techniques. Includes LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting), SMB attacks, and domain privilege escalation. Use this when targeting Windows domain environments.