Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-vpsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ogrodev/fsocietyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-vps)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-vps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/op-vps.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00019 | $0.01005 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00502 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00201 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00101 |
Grade A, and why
op-vps scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Storage Policy: ALL output files MUST be saved in the project directory. NEVER write to /tmp/ or any system temporary directory.
VPS Hardening and Setup
Target and options: $ARGUMENTS
-
Parse
$ARGUMENTSfor VPS IP address,--provider(defaultauto), and--profile(defaultnormal). The profile determines the opsec posture applied across all phases. -
Ask the user for SSH credentials or key path via
AskUserQuestionif not obvious from the environment or arguments. -
Set the opsec profile for the session:
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/opsec-profile.js" set <profile>normal— standard hardening, full loggingstealth— aggressive hardening, minimal loggingparanoid— maximum hardening, no logging, encrypted everything
-
Phase 1 — SSH Hardening: Connect to the VPS and lock down SSH:
- Deploy SSH public key and disable password authentication
- Change SSH port to a non-standard port (randomized high port)
- Set
PermitRootLogin no,MaxAuthTries 3,AllowUsers <operator> - Restart sshd and verify reconnection on the new port
-
Phase 2 — Firewall Setup: Configure nftables with deny-by-default policy:
- Default INPUT and FORWARD policy: DROP
- Allow only the new SSH port, and any explicitly needed service ports
- Allow established/related connections
- Rate-limit new connections to prevent brute-force
-
Phase 3 — Fail2ban: Install and configure fail2ban:
- Set up an aggressive SSH jail:
maxretry=2,bantime=3600,findtime=600 - Configure email or webhook notifications if desired
- Enable and start the fail2ban service
- Set up an aggressive SSH jail:
-
Phase 4 — Unattended Upgrades: Configure automatic security patching:
- Install
unattended-upgradespackage - Enable automatic security updates only (no feature updates)
- Configure auto-reboot if needed (with time window)
- Install
-
Phase 5 — Encrypted Storage: Set up LUKS-encrypted container for operational data:
- Create a file-backed LUKS container:
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/root/vault.img bs=1M count=512 - Format with LUKS:
cryptsetup luksFormat /root/vault.img - Open and mount:
cryptsetup open /root/vault.img vault && mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/vault && mount /dev/mapper/vault /mnt/vault - Ask user for the encryption passphrase via
AskUserQuestion
- Create a file-backed LUKS container:
-
Phase 6 — VPN Killswitch: Configure iptables rules to prevent traffic leaks:
- Allow traffic only through VPN tunnel interface (tun0/wg0)
- Allow loopback and the VPN server's IP on the physical interface
- Drop all other outbound traffic
- Persist rules with
iptables-save
-
Phase 7 — DNS Leak Prevention: Force all DNS through VPN or Tor:
- Set
/etc/resolv.confto use VPN-provided DNS or Tor DNS (127.0.0.1:5353) - Make resolv.conf immutable:
chattr +i /etc/resolv.conf - Verify no DNS leaks with external test
- Set
-
Phase 8 — Log Management: Configure logging based on the opsec profile:
normal: standard syslog and journald, rotate weeklystealth: minimal logging — disable auth.log verbose entries, reduce journal retention to 1 dayparanoid: disable all persistent logging — setStorage=volatilein journald.conf, truncate all log files, disable rsyslog
-
Log each setup phase to the ops tracker:
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/ops-tracker.js" add <vps-ip> vps-setup <phase> "<action>" <result> <severity> -
Write a comprehensive VPS setup report to the project directory. Include all configuration changes, credentials/ports to remember, and operational notes.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 75 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 38eb0bb6d4c6
op-vps is a command published in the GitHub repository ogrodev/fsociety (20 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 1,005 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other commands, from other repositories
pentest
Activate pentest mode — displays ASCII art, configures session isolation, collects engagement scope, then OWNS the engagement: pre-flight, recon, planning (via the pentester-orchestrator planner), executor dispatch, a time-budget quota loop, aggregation, and report generation.
pentest-attacks
Define the attack profile for an engagement — select which attack categories and skills to use. Saves to .pentest-attacks.json. If run before /pentest:pentest, the orchestrator will respect the selection. If run standalone, does not launch a pentest.
pentest-kali
Connect to a Metasploit-Kali Server (MKS) REST API — verifies connectivity, discovers available Kali tools, and configures agents to prefer MKS endpoints over local Bash equivalents.
pentest-scope
Define or update engagement scope — saves scope to disk without launching a pentest. Can be run before or during an engagement. If a pentest is active and the target changes drastically, warns the operator and suggests a new engagement.
pentest-exit
Close pentest session — summarizes findings, ensures outputs are saved, lifts isolation, and prompts for /clear.
bb-ad
Active Directory enumeration and attack techniques. Includes LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting), SMB attacks, and domain privilege escalation. Use this when targeting Windows domain environments.