Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/studioKjm/ai-harness-templatenpx agentmods add commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggers)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggers/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/studiokjm/ai-harness-template/threat-triggers.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.01122 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00561 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00224 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00112 |
Grade A, and why
threat-triggers scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/threat-triggers — Configure What Auto-Requires Threat Models
Tune the list of "sensitive" patterns that warn when uncovered.
When to use
- First time using threat-model-lite — review default triggers
- Project has unusual sensitive entities not in defaults (e.g.,
health_record,tax_id) - Some default triggers don't apply (e.g., no payment in this project)
- Want to add custom file path patterns
Usage
/threat-triggers show # Print current triggers
/threat-triggers add-pattern --category CAT --pattern "..."
/threat-triggers add-path "PATH-GLOB"
/threat-triggers exempt --path "..." --reason "..."
/threat-triggers init # Re-initialize from default template
Default triggers
The bundled triggers.yaml covers:
| Category | Patterns | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| authentication | auth*, login*, password, session, token, jwt, oauth, saml, sso, mfa, 2fa | high |
| payment | payment, billing, invoice, refund, charge, subscription, checkout, card, wallet | critical |
| pii | email, phone, ssn, name, address, kyc, identity, passport, birthdate | high |
| authorization | admin, role, permission, rbac, abac, scope, grant | high |
| secrets | secret, api_key, apikey, private_key, credential | critical |
Plus path patterns:
**/auth/**,**/payment/**,**/billing/**,**/admin/**,**/security/**
Plus endpoint patterns:
POST /login,POST /signup,POST /password/*,*/admin/*,POST /payment/*,POST /webhook/*
Instructions
Step 1 — Read current triggers
cat .harness/threat-model-lite/triggers.yaml
If the file doesn't exist (methodology just activated), copy from template:
cp .harness/methodologies/threat-model-lite/templates/triggers.yaml \
.harness/threat-model-lite/triggers.yaml
Step 2 — Edit triggers.yaml directly
The triggers file is a hand-edit YAML. Add/remove categories, patterns, paths, endpoints. Schema:
sensitive_entities:
<category-name>:
patterns: ["pattern1", "pattern2*"]
severity: low | medium | high | critical
sensitive_paths:
- "**/glob/pattern/**"
sensitive_endpoints:
- "POST /route"
- "GET /route/*"
exemptions:
paths: ["specific/path/that/is/safe"]
reasons:
"specific/path/that/is/safe": "documented reason"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 135 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A 8b3682c5ed7c
threat-triggers is a command published in the GitHub repository studioKjm/ai-harness-template (43 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 1,122 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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