Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/armoriq/armorCodexWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/hooks/armoriq/armorcodex/user-prompt-submit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/hooks/armoriq/armorcodex/user-prompt-submit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/hooks/armoriq/armorcodex/user-prompt-submit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/hooks/armoriq/armorcodex/user-prompt-submit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/hooks/armoriq/armorcodex/user-prompt-submit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>Grade A, and why
UserPromptSubmit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the commands this hook runs, not an audit. A hook is shell that executes on your machine at the event it names, which is why every command in it is printed with what was found.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
{
"UserPromptSubmit": [
{
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "node ./scripts/bootstrap.mjs router",
"statusMessage": "Loading ArmorCodex intent policy"
}
]
}
]
}What else hooks.json configures
This page is one entry in a file that holds 6. Installing the file brings all of them; each is measured and scanned on its own page.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 13 lines scan A 52856351ff20
UserPromptSubmit is a hook published in the GitHub repository armoriq/armorCodex (6 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: a hook is shell that never enters the context. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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SessionStart
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