Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/The-Artificer-of-Ciphers-LLC/skills-from-the-artificerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/hooks/the-artificer-of-ciphers-llc/skills-from-the-artificer/user-prompt-submit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/hooks/the-artificer-of-ciphers-llc/skills-from-the-artificer/user-prompt-submit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/hooks/the-artificer-of-ciphers-llc/skills-from-the-artificer/user-prompt-submit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/hooks/the-artificer-of-ciphers-llc/skills-from-the-artificer/user-prompt-submit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/hooks/the-artificer-of-ciphers-llc/skills-from-the-artificer/user-prompt-submit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>Grade A, and why
UserPromptSubmit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the commands this hook runs, not an audit. A hook is shell that executes on your machine at the event it names, which is why every command in it is printed with what was found.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 12 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
{
"UserPromptSubmit": [
{
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "cat <<'HOOK_OUTPUT'\nINSTRUCTION: MANDATORY SWIFT TEAM CHECK\nBefore proceeding with any task involving Swift code, SwiftUI views, UIKit\nviews, async/await, actors, Sendable, @MainActor, Foundation Models, MLX,\nCore ML, coremltools, model conversion, MLX, MLXLLM, MLXVLM, MLXLMCommon,\nLLMModelFactory, ChatSession, GenerateParameters, LoRA, Hugging Face models,\nKeychain, CryptoKit, biometric auth,\nApp Store submission, testing, SwiftData, @Model, ModelContainer, @Query,\npersistence, schema migration, visionOS, RealityKit, ARKit, immersive spaces,\nspatial computing, StoreKit, in-app purchases, subscriptions, Product,\nTransaction, performance profiling, Instruments, MetricKit, hang detection,\nlaunch time, memory optimization, Meta Wearables DAT, or any iOS/macOS/visionOS\napplication code:\n\n1. Delegate to the swift-lead agent\n2. The swift-lead will determine which specialist agents are needed\n3. Do NOT write Swift UI code without mobile-a11y-specialist review\n4. Do NOT write concurrent code without concurrency-specialist review\n5. Do NOT handle credentials or encryption without swift-security-specialist review\n6. Do NOT submit to App Store without app-review-guardian review\n7. Do NOT convert or optimize ML models without coreml-specialist review\n8. Do NOT use MLX Swift, MLXLLM, or MLXVLM without mlx-specialist review\n9. Do NOT write SwiftData models or queries without swiftdata-specialist review\n10. Do NOT build visionOS or RealityKit features without visionos-specialist review\n11. Do NOT implement in-app purchases without storekit-specialist review\n12. Do NOT optimize performance without performance-specialist review\n\nCRITICAL RULES:\n- For NEW projects or features: Enter plan mode FIRST. Design architecture before writing code.\n- NEVER create mock, placeholder, or stub implementations. All code must be real and functional.\n- Use builtWhat else hooks.json configures
This page is one entry in a file that holds 3. Installing the file brings all of them; each is measured and scanned on its own page.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 12 lines scan A bcc79d01fd36
UserPromptSubmit is a hook published in the GitHub repository The-Artificer-of-Ciphers-LLC/skills-from-the-artificer (6 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: a hook is shell that never enters the context. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-15.
Other hooks, from other repositories
PostToolUse
Runs after a tool call finishes for Edit, Write, Bash and mcp__github__create_pull_request tool calls, executing security-scan.sh, validate-generated-artifacts.sh, track-test-results.sh and post-pr-creation.sh (4 commands). From troykelly/claude-skills.
SessionStart
Runs when a session starts on startup, executing install_pkgs.sh. From supabase/supabase.
PostToolUse
Runs after a tool call finishes for Write and Edit tool calls, executing format_and_lint.sh. From supabase/supabase.
SessionStart
Runs when a session starts, executing on-start.js via node. From google-gemini/gemini-cli.
PreToolUse
Runs before the agent uses a tool for Bash tool calls, running an inline shell check. From apache/superset.
PreToolUse
Runs before the agent uses a tool, executing pre-write.sh and pre-bash.sh (2 commands). From anthropics/claude-cookbooks.