Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cubha/claude-workflow-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/plugins/cubha/claude-workflow-plugins/ship)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/plugins/cubha/claude-workflow-plugins/ship"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/plugins/cubha/claude-workflow-plugins/ship/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/plugins/cubha/claude-workflow-plugins/ship"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/plugins/cubha/claude-workflow-plugins/ship.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>Grade A, and why
ship scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
{
"name": "ship",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "One-shot release pipeline: commit, push, PR, merge, and branch cleanup. Auto-adapts branch strategy -- git-flow (feature to develop to main) if a develop branch exists, otherwise GitHub Flow (feature to main). Runs a pre-merge gate bundle: functional check (verify.sh or the project's test command), security scan (bundled security-auditor), DB migration review (bundled db-schema-reviewer), and a sensitive-file (.env, credentials) block.",
"author": {
"name": "cubha"
}
}
What it installs
The manifest is a name and a version. 1 skill, 2 agents travel with it, and installing the plugin installs all of them — 267 tokens a session between them. Each is measured on its own page, and each can be installed alone.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 9 lines scan A 14c31a7819fc
ship is a plugin published in the GitHub repository cubha/claude-workflow-plugins (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other plugins, from other repositories
github-workflow
Git commit, PR creation, review, and merge skills following Conventional Commits.
changelog-generator
Generates a structured CHANGELOG.md following Keep a Changelog format from git history and ABD handoff artifacts. Prepends new version sections to existing changelogs.
git-workflow
Enforces the release-branch Git model: scaffold feature branches, open PRs with review checks, cut releases with tags, and view workflow reference.
open-source
Collection of skills for open-source R and Python package developers.
delivery-suite
Publish the intended changes and verify what reached the remote repository or target environment.
privacy-guard
Keeps private infrastructure details out of public repositories. Ships the privacy-guard skill: session rules for what must never cross the public boundary, plus a per-repo pre-commit gate built on a gitignored local denylist and gitleaks. The denylist is never committed, so the hook is a no-op for external…