Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00123 | $0.02492 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00062 | $0.01246 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00498 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00249 |
Grade A, and why
container-audit scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- No `chmod 4755` SUID binaries in the final image Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- `ADD <url>` follows redirects and disables checksum verification — prefer `RUN curl ... && sha256sum -c` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 194 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Audit — Docker & Kubernetes Security Review
Audit container images, Dockerfiles, Helm charts, Kustomize overlays, and Kubernetes manifests for misconfiguration, excessive privilege, exposed secrets, and runtime security gaps. Distinct from cloud-audit (cloud-provider IAM and managed services) and dependency-audit (package CVEs in the application). This skill is the container/orchestration layer between them.
Scope the Audit
- Inventory the surface — Dockerfiles, base images, registries, Helm charts, K8s manifests, Kustomize overlays, CI build pipelines that produce images
- Identify the runtime — vanilla K8s, EKS, GKE, AKS, OpenShift, ECS Fargate, Cloud Run, Fly.io
- Identify the network model — service mesh, ingress controller, default-deny vs default-allow
- Identify the secret model — K8s Secrets (base64-only), External Secrets Operator, sealed-secrets, Vault, Doppler
Audit Checklist — Dockerfile
Base image & supply chain
- Pinned by digest, not tag —
FROM node:20@sha256:abc...notFROM node:20(which can move) - Distroless / minimal where possible —
gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20,alpine(be aware of musl quirks),chainguard/* - Not using
:latest— non-reproducible builds - Multi-stage builds discard build-time tooling —
FROM build AS builder→FROM runtimefinal stage - Grep for:
FROM .*:latest,FROM .*:[0-9]+$(tag without digest)
Build-time exposure
- Secrets passed via
--build-argend up in image layers visible to anyone who pulls the image — use BuildKit secrets (--mount=type=secret) or runtime env vars instead COPY . .ships everything in the build context —.dockerignoreshould exclude.git,.env,node_modules,*.pem,.aws/,.ssh/ADD <url>follows redirects and disables checksum verification — preferRUN curl ... && sha256sum -c- Grep for:
ARG .*KEY,ARG .*TOKEN,ARG .*SECRET,ENV .*=.*[A-Za-z0-9]{32,},ADD http
Runtime posture
- Non-root user —
USER 1001(or any non-zero UID) beforeCMD - No
chmod 4755SUID binaries in the final image - No unnecessary shells / package managers in the final stage — distroless / FROM scratch is the strong default
HEALTHCHECKdefined so orchestrator can detect unhealthy containers- Read-only root filesystem at runtime (set via K8s; verify nothing in the image writes outside
/tmpor a declared volume) - Grep for:
USER root(or absence of anyUSERdirective),chmod 4755,apt-get install.*sudo
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 194 lines · 123 tokens per session scan A b25aa69f478a
container-audit is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills (384 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 123 tokens to every session and 2,492 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
python-containerization-cursorrules-prompt-file
Cursor rules for Python development with containerization integration.
aws-ecs
Definitive guidelines for building, deploying, and operating applications on AWS ECS, emphasizing immutable containers, secure secrets management, and robust operational patterns.
hack
Hack is local-first. This project uses hack for local runtime orchestration (compose + DNS/TLS + logs + sessions). Prefer hack when shell access is available. Use MCP only when shell access is unavailable.
colima-docker-runtime
This workspace uses Colima for Docker; use compose-backed tests when Colima is running.
local-compose-db-lifecycle-for-web-tests
Keep local compose DB lifecycle ready for web tests.
runwhen-infrastructure
Infrastructure conventions for scripts targeting Kubernetes and databases via RunWhen runners.