Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kubev2v/forklift-console-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/webhooks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/webhooks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/webhooks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/webhooks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/webhooks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.02992 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.01197 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00598 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00299 |
Grade A, and why
webhooks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 29d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 301 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Forklift API Webhooks
Analyzed from commit:
baf9c7bcc307ed9358ad59886a5536366a050012on 2026-09-17 Source paths:pkg/forklift-api/webhooks/,pkg/forklift-api/api.go
Package Purpose
The forklift-api process runs Kubernetes admission webhooks over TLS. It validates and mutates Forklift CRDs (Plans, Migrations, Providers) and their associated Secrets before they are persisted to etcd. Webhooks enforce authorization, connection testing, storage compatibility, and default field population.
Server Setup
pkg/forklift-api/api.go → ForkliftApi.Execute()
├── goroutine: serveServices() → :8444 (REST services, see rest-api.mdc)
└── serveWebhooks() → :8443 (admission webhooks)
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Port | 8443 |
| TLS certs | API_TLS_CERTIFICATE, API_TLS_KEY env vars |
| Framework | Plain net/http.ServeMux |
| API version | admission/v1beta1 (backwards-compatible with v1) |
Key Types and Structs
Admitter Interface (validating-webhook/validating-webhook.go)
type Admitter interface {
Admit(*admissionv1.AdmissionReview) *admissionv1.AdmissionResponse
}
Implementations: SecretAdmitter, PlanAdmitter, ProviderAdmitter, MigrationAdmitter.
Mutator Interface (mutating-webhook/mutating-webhook.go)
type mutator interface {
Mutate(*admissionv1.AdmissionReview) *admissionv1.AdmissionResponse
}
Implementations: SecretMutator, PlanMutator, ProviderMutator.
PatchOperation (webhooks/util/util.go)
type PatchOperation struct {
Op string `json:"op"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Value interface{} `json:"value"`
}
Used by mutating webhooks to produce RFC 6902 JSON Patches.
Webhook Paths
Validating Webhooks
| Path | Handler | Resource |
|---|---|---|
/secret-validate |
SecretAdmitter |
Secret (labeled for Forklift) |
/plan-validate |
PlanAdmitter |
Plan |
/provider-validate |
ProviderAdmitter |
Provider |
/migration-validate |
MigrationAdmitter |
Migration |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 29d ago Changed · +66 lines b3bf44286ab5
- 1mo ago First seen · 235 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 2eddf4e5f1ae
webhooks is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin (11 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 2,992 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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env-validation-gate
Env validation gate — every app with ≥1 required env var validates its contract at boot via Zod; raw process.env is banned outside the env module. Full pattern in .claude/skills/t2000-env-gate/.