Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-templateWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template/ci)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template/ci"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template/ci/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template/ci"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template/ci.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.02579 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.01032 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00516 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00258 |
Grade A, and why
ci scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 37 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Continuous Integration
The gate is .github/workflows/ci.yml; read it for the step list. It is both the PR check and a reusable workflow: release.yml's gate job calls it, so every push to main is validated before a tag is cut (release.mdc). Deploy: cd.mdc. This rule loads with every workflow, so its expression-context, script, and hardening rules apply to all of them (install and telemetry: where a workflow installs or runs the tools).
Expression contexts - read before touching env:
Workflow-level env: may reference only github, secrets, inputs, vars; job-level env: adds needs, strategy, matrix; runner, job, steps, and env are step-level only. An unavailable context is a validation error: the file stops parsing, GitHub reports the run under the file path instead of the workflow name, and zero jobs execute - it never degrades to an empty string (this once left ci.yml and cd.yml unparseable for 14 pushes). Anything needing $RUNNER_TEMP goes through a step:
- run: echo "NODE_COMPILE_CACHE=$RUNNER_TEMP/node-compile-cache" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
Invariants
- Triggers:
pull_request,workflow_call,workflow_dispatch. Nopush:-release.yml'sgatecovers pushes tomain, so a commit is never checked twice. - The required check is the job name
Lint, typecheck, test, and build(themainruleset, strict up-to-date): renaming thecijob leaves every PR waiting on a check that never reports. - Parity is about the kinds of checks, not the mechanism: change both sides when adding or renaming a gate (
deps:format:checkexists because both call it by name). Locallypnpm run ciispnpm run types,pnpm run boundaries, oneturbo runof the//#root tasks pluscheck-types test build deploy:checkwith--continue=dependencies-successful, thenpnpm run audit; here the same checks are separateparallel:steps calling barepnpm runscripts. The local&&chain is deliberately serial (typesbefore type-aware lint,boundariesa cheap fail-fast pre-gate,audita success-gated network tail); a parallel-sections rewrite was rejected to keep the gate zero-dependency. Never route the workflow through the//#tasks: a root task's default inputs span the repo, so underfutureFlags.affectedUsingTaskInputsit would always be affected and defeat--affected. - Scope by event:
--affectedonpull_requestonly, the full graph onworkflow_call/workflow_dispatch(a release validates everything), expressed as twoif:-gated steps - never interpolate the flag into arun:body. The dependency audit ispull_request-only for the inverse reason: the advisory DB changes daily, so an auditing release gate is not a pure function of the commit (localpnpm run cistill audits). - The Changesets step is
pull_request-only, like the audit:release:checkdiffs againstorigin/main, so the release gate has nothing to check. Locallyci,ci:agent, andci:sandboxrun it as//#release:check;ci:affecteddoes not, since mid-task a changeset is not due yet.CHANGESET_ALLOW_MAJORreads therelease:majorlabel from the event payload, and label events start no CI run, so adding the label takes a re-run of the job. The step also getsGITHUB_TOKEN(the job'scontents: read) to read the basepnpm-workspace.yamlthrough the API.CHANGESET_SKIP_RUNTIME_DEPENDENCIESis set only on a Dependabot PR whenCHANGESET_BOT_TOKENis absent (release.mdc). - No
TURBO_SCM_BASE: onpull_requestturbo infers the base from GitHub Actions, andfutureFlags.githubActionsRemoteBaseRefFallbackresolves it toorigin/<base_ref>(checkout creates only remote-tracking refs). Never set it off PRs:github.event.beforeis all-zeros on a new branch, which silently degrades--affectedto "everything changed". Keepfetch-depth: 0+filter: blob:none. - One job, with the
parallel:step keyword (GA 2026-06-25, alongsidebackground/wait/wait-all/cancel) for OXC (lint:ci, pinned to--format=githubfor PR annotations, andformat),boundaries,syncpack, and zizmor; Knip is diagnostic only, never a step here or inpnpm run ci(quality-report.mdc). Aparallel:list item takes no sibling keys. At most 10 background steps run at once and a PR runs 9, so an eleventh item would queue behind the others. The "Generate cf types" step (pnpm run types) runs beforeparallel:: type-aware lint needs the gitignored types, and the parallel turbo step, their only other producer, is--affectedon PRs. There is no types-drift step (nothing generated is committed).check-types test build deploy:checkis a singleturbo run --continue=dependencies-successfulat default concurrency (no override inturbo.json), so one run reports every package's failures. - The deploy dry-run is the
deploy:checktask (cf deploy --prebuilt --mode production --dry-runper app) inside that single run, never a step after the join:turbo run deploy -- --dry-runhashes the pass-through args into every task of the graph, so the whole app build re-ran uncached. It depends onbuildonly, and with--prebuiltneeds neither token nor account ID, so the job gets no Cloudflare variables.ci:sandboxdrops it withbuild: cf also stats the app's.env, which the agent sandbox denies (EPERM), andSKIP_ENV_FILESdoes not reachcf deploy. - The release PR's check comes from a dispatched run: GitHub holds the
pull_requestruns of agithub-actions[bot]PR ataction_requireduntil a writer approves them, sorelease.yml'sversionjob runsgh workflow run ci.yml --ref changeset-release/main; a dispatch is exempt, and its run reports the bare job name on the PR head. The job-levelifstill skips an approvedpull_requestrun of that PR, whoserelease:checkwould fail on the changesets the PR consumes. It is bound tohead_ref == 'changeset-release/main'and authorgithub-actions[bot]: a prefix match would let any PR skip the required check by naming its branch, and apull_requestbranches-ignorefilters the base branch, so it cannot express this. - Step bodies longer than a few lines are scripts under
.github/actions/<concern>/(cd/,changesets/,previews/,quality/,release/; shared modules inlib/), not inline YAML. Invoke withbash <path>, wire inputs through step-levelenv:, open each script withset -euo pipefail, and fail fast on missing input (:?guards or an explicit check). Short steps stay inline. - Install, in every workflow that installs:
pnpm install --frozen-lockfileafterpnpm/setupwithinstall: false; Noderuntime: node@26, matching root engines. - Only
ci.ymlsaves the pnpm store cache:actions/cachekeyed onhashFiles('pnpm-lock.yaml'), neverpnpm/setup'scache: true, whose key includes the run id and saved a new ~300 MB entry on every job.quality.yml'sanalyzejob andchangeset-pr-status.yml'spr-statusjob restore the same key read-only withactions/cache/restore(quality-report.mdc). Jobs holding a write token or Cloudflare credentials (version, CD, Previews) restore no cache: defense in depth, since cache scoping already keeps PR entries away frommain. - Remote cache: job env wires
TURBO_TOKEN,TURBO_TEAM, andTURBO_REMOTE_CACHE_SIGNATURE_KEY(repo secret, >= 32 bytes, the same value as local machines;turbo.jsonenablesremoteCache.signature+longerSignatureKey).workflow_calldeclares those secrets explicitly so the release gate never receives Cloudflare credentials; neversecrets: inherit.TURBO_CACHEislocal:rw,remote:rwonpull_requestandlocal:rw,remote:weverywhere else: signing checks integrity, not trust, and same-repo PR runs hold both token and key, so a PR could upload an entry the release gate would replay as a passingcheck-types/test/build; write-only makes the gate run the full graph fresh and publish trusted artifacts. CD has no Turbo token at all.envModeisstrict: a workflowenv:value reaches a turbo task only ifturbo.jsonlists it inenv/passThroughEnv. - Hardening, every workflow: every
uses:is a full-length commit SHA with a# vX.Y.Zcomment;actions/checkoutsetspersist-credentials: false; workflowpermissions: {}with per-job re-grants (ci.yml:contents: readonly - artifact upload andactions/cacheuse the runner's runtime token, notGITHUB_TOKEN); a same-repouses:is$/<path>(this repository at the running commit, no checkout needed), never./<path>- Dependabot ignores both; runnersubuntu-24.04, neverubuntu-latest. A workflow that runs turbo, cf, or Wrangler turns telemetry off at workflowenv:(DO_NOT_TRACKcovers cf;CF_SEND_TELEMETRY: "false"besideWRANGLER_SEND_METRICS). cancel-in-progressonly onpull_request. Never interpolategithub.ref_nameinto script bodies. No production or Cloudflare secrets in this workflow (CD only).- Never add scanners "for completeness" without a concrete threat and owner. zizmor (the
Workflow securitystep) has both: workflow edits, often agent-written, that bring an unpinned or impostor pin, a# vX.Y.Zcomment not matching its SHA, template injection, or permission creep; the owner is the/.github/CODEOWNERS entry. It ispull_request-only like the audit, since its online audits query the GitHub API, and CI-only (no Node distribution): reproduce withuvx zizmor .when uv is available. Fix a finding; an unavoidable one gets an inline# zizmor: ignore[<audit>]naming why.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed 1446912d6844
- 20d ago Changed 4a3ba9d51eeb
- 22d ago Changed · +3 lines 50024c57211a
- 23d ago Changed 1e06fcb3bc6d
- 25d ago Changed 1568dab49229
- 27d ago Changed ceec4143a1d1
- 1mo ago First seen · 34 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A e09686cb2ef8
ci is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository louisbrulenaudet/monorepo-template (19 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,579 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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analyze-issue
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