Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/netlify/context-and-toolsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/netlify/context-and-tools/netlify-mcp-servers-file-uploads)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/netlify/context-and-tools/netlify-mcp-servers-file-uploads"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/netlify/context-and-tools/netlify-mcp-servers-file-uploads.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00017 | $0.00887 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00443 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00177 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00089 |
Grade A, and why
netlify-mcp-servers-file-uploads scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 53 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
File Uploads via MCP
When a tool needs the agent to supply a file — an image to post, a document to attach — don't push the bytes through the tool call. Base64 in a tool argument bloats the model's context, is slow, and hits payload limits. Instead, hand the agent a short-lived presigned URL it can PUT raw bytes to, then reference the stored file by a stable key in your other tools. Files land in Netlify Blobs.
The three-step flow
prepare_upload(tool) — the agent declaresfilename,contentType, andsize. You return a short-lived signed URL (≈5 min, single-use) plus an opaqueuploadHandle. The signature is the authorization, so thePUTitself needs no bearer header.- Agent
PUTs the raw bytes to that URL with the matchingContent-Type. A second Netlify Function (e.g.path: "/mcp/upload/:token") verifies the signed token, checks the declared content-type and size, and writes the bytes to Blobs. finalize_upload(tool) — the agent passes theuploadHandleback; you confirm the bytes landed and return a stable blob key. That key is what the agent then passes tocreate_post,attach_file, etc.
This keeps large binaries entirely out of the JSON-RPC channel, and the short single-use URL means a leaked link is near-useless.
Signing the URL
Sign a small payload (upload id, content-type, size cap, expiry) with HMAC-SHA256 using a secret env var, and verify in constant time on the PUT. Never trust an unsigned upload path — without the signature, anyone could write to your store.
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
const secret = () => Netlify.env.get("MCP_UPLOAD_SIGNING_SECRET")!;
export function signUploadToken(payload: object): string {
const body = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString("base64url");
const sig = createHmac("sha256", secret()).update(body).digest("base64url");
return `${body}.${sig}`;
}
export function verifyUploadToken(token: string) {
const [body, sig] = token.split(".");
if (!body || !sig) return null;
const expected = createHmac("sha256", secret()).update(body).digest();
const got = Buffer.from(sig, "base64url");
if (got.length !== expected.length || !timingSafeEqual(got, expected)) return null;
const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(body, "base64url").toString());
if (Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) > payload.exp) return null; // expired
return payload;
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 53 lines · 17 tokens per session scan A c53b4fea6892
netlify-mcp-servers-file-uploads is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository netlify/context-and-tools (36 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 17 tokens to every session and 887 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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