Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add 26zl/cybersec-toolkit --skill bounty-webgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/26zl/cybersec-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-web)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-web"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-web/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-web"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-web.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 59 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 59 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 60 Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 71 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00081 | $0.01437 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00041 | $0.00718 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00287 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00144 |
Grade B, and why
bounty-web scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- Always test cloud metadata: AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP `metadata.google.internal`, Azure `169.254.169.254/metadata/instance` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Race conditions on permission grants:** use `turbo-intruder` or parallel curl. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 141 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Bug bounty web testing methodology
Build on top of bounty-recon results. Tool-first: use SecLists wordlists (already cloned in this installer) before writing custom payloads.
1. Authentication & session
| Test | How |
|---|---|
| Default creds | hydra, manual common pairs (admin:admin, root:root) |
| User enum (different errors) | manual login form probing |
| Account takeover via password reset | inspect token entropy, host header injection on reset email |
| Session fixation | check if session ID is set before login |
| Session predictability | gather 50+ tokens, run statistical analysis |
| MFA bypass | response manipulation (401→200), brute the OTP, race the verify endpoint |
| Login CSRF | missing CSRF token on /login |
| Logout / impersonation flaws | swap session cookies, replay |
2. Authorization (highest-paying class)
- IDOR: swap numeric IDs, UUIDs, encoded IDs. Try both directions: A→B and B→A.
- BFLA: swap roles. Test admin endpoints as a regular user.
- BOLA (API): access another user's resource by ID.
- Path traversal in route params:
/users/../admin/users. - JWT scope claims: modify
role: user→role: admin, re-sign or use alg=none. - Race conditions on permission grants: use
turbo-intruderor parallel curl.
Methodology: enumerate all endpoints with low-privilege user, then re-request each with no auth, expired token, and other-user token. Diff responses.
3. Input handling
XSS
# DOM/reflected discovery
dalfox url https://target.com/?q=test
xsstrike -u "https://target.com/?q=FUZZ"
# Stored — manual; create accounts and probe every input field
CSP analysis: parse Content-Security-Policy header — look for unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, wildcards, exploitable allowlisted CDNs (*.googleapis.com allows JSONP).
SQLi
sqlmap -u "https://target.com/page?id=1" --batch --level=5 --risk=2 --random-agent
# When WAF blocks
sqlmap ... --tamper=between,space2comment,charencode
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 141 lines · 81 tokens per session scan B 1ed22703c748
bounty-web is a skill published in the GitHub repository 26zl/cybersec-toolkit (54 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 81 tokens to every session and 1,437 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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../../../red-team/web-enumeration/SKILL.md.
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