Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add 26zl/cybersec-toolkit --skill building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-adgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/26zl/cybersec-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 88 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.02164 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00025 | $0.01082 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00433 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00216 |
Grade A, and why
building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
2 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad — 91% identical, 37 lines differ
- building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad — 83% identical, 30 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 240 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Building Identity Federation with SAML Azure AD
Overview
Identity federation enables users authenticated by one identity provider to access resources managed by another without maintaining separate credentials. This skill covers establishing SAML 2.0 federation between an organization's on-premises Active Directory (via AD FS or third-party IdP) and Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD), as well as configuring federated SSO for third-party SaaS applications. Federation eliminates password synchronization concerns and keeps authentication authority on-premises while extending SSO to cloud resources.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring building identity federation with saml azure ad capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- On-premises Active Directory domain
- AD FS 2019+ or third-party SAML IdP (Okta, Ping, etc.)
- Microsoft Entra ID tenant (P1 or P2 license recommended)
- Azure AD Connect (if using hybrid identity with password hash sync as backup)
- Public TLS certificate for federation endpoint
- DNS records for federation service name
Core Concepts
Federation Models
| Model | Authentication Authority | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Federated (AD FS) | On-premises AD FS | Regulatory requirement to keep auth on-prem |
| Managed (PHS) | Azure AD with password hash sync | Simplest cloud auth, AD FS not needed |
| Managed (PTA) | On-premises via pass-through agent | Cloud auth validated against on-prem AD |
| Third-Party Federation | External IdP (Okta, Ping) | Multi-IdP environment |
SAML Federation Architecture
User → Cloud App (SP)
│
└── Redirect to Azure AD
│
├── Azure AD checks federated domain
│
└── Redirect to on-premises AD FS
│
├── AD FS authenticates against Active Directory
│
├── AD FS issues SAML token
│
└── Token posted back to Azure AD
│
├── Azure AD validates federation trust
│
├── Azure AD issues its own token
│
└── User receives access token for cloud app
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 240 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A cf9a95132eeb
building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad is a skill published in the GitHub repository 26zl/cybersec-toolkit (54 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 2,164 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad
Configure SAML 2.0 identity federation between on-premises Active Directory (via AD FS or a third-party IdP) and Microsoft Entra ID, covering federation models (AD FS, password hash sync, pass-through auth, third-party IdP) and the SAML authentication flow. Use when extending on-premises authentication authority to…
building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad
Establish SAML 2.0 identity federation between on-premises Active Directory and Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID) for seamless cross-domain authentication and SSO to cloud applications.
building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad
Establish SAML 2.0 identity federation between on-premises Active Directory and Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID) for seamless cross-domain authentication and SSO to cloud applications.
saml-sso-attack
Attack SAML SSO via XSW, signature strip, metadata extract.
detecting-oauth-token-theft
Detects and responds to OAuth token theft and replay attacks in cloud environments, focusing on Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) token protection, conditional access policies, and sign-in anomaly detection. Covers access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, and pass-the-cookie attacks.…
hunt-saml
Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID ([email protected] @attacker.com → some parsers see [email protected]), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject…