Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai --skill hunt-auth-bypassgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-auth-bypass)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-auth-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-auth-bypass/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-auth-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-auth-bypass.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 137 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 197 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 159 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.04600 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.01840 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00920 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00460 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-auth-bypass scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -X POST https://target.com/xmlrpc.php \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 326 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Crown Jewel Targets
Auth bypass is consistently one of the highest-paying vulnerability classes in bug bounty because it directly violates the most fundamental security control. High-value targets include:
- SSO/SAML implementations at enterprise SaaS companies (Slack, Okta, OneLogin integrations) — payouts regularly in the $5K–$25K+ range
- Admin panels and partner/internal portals — subdomain-separated admin surfaces like
partners.shopify.com,admin.company.com - Third-party auth plugin integrations — WordPress plugins (OneLogin, WP-SAML-Auth), Drupal SSO modules, any CMS with pluggable auth
- XMLRPC endpoints on WordPress — often forgotten, bypasses standard WP auth flows entirely
- OAuth callback flows — state parameter mishandling, redirect_uri mismatches
- API authentication layers — especially where auth was bolted on after the fact
Asset priority: Targets with federated identity (SAML, OAuth, OIDC) connected to large user populations. Partner/reseller portals are particularly juicy because they often have elevated permissions and less security scrutiny than the main product.
Attack Surface Signals
URL patterns to hunt:
/xmlrpc.php
/wp-login.php
/saml/
/sso/
/auth/saml/callback
/oauth/callback
/partners.*
/admin.*
/?wc-api=
/api/v*/auth
/login?redirect=
/accounts/login
Response headers signaling SSO:
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (common on SSO portals)
Set-Cookie: SAMLResponse=
Location: https://idp.company.com/saml
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="partners"
JS patterns indicating federated auth:
// Look for in page source
samlRequest
RelayState
SAMLResponse
onelogin
shibboleth
okta
passport.js authenticate
Tech stack signals:
- WordPress + any SSO plugin → check XMLRPC separately
- Shopify Partner API exposure → cross-tenant privilege escalation risk
- Any app advertising "SSO enabled" or "Login with [Enterprise IdP]"
- Separate subdomains for admin/partner that share session cookies with main domain
- Applications using
SimpleSAMLphp,ruby-saml,python-saml
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 326 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 8c52dae43298
hunt-auth-bypass is a skill published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (72 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 4,600 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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