Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ADScanPro/Claude-AD --skill ad-environment-constraintsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ADScanPro/Claude-ADWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/ad-environment-constraints)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/ad-environment-constraints"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/ad-environment-constraints/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/ad-environment-constraints"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/ad-environment-constraints.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 171 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 115 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00183 | $0.03050 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00092 | $0.01525 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00610 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00305 |
Grade B, and why
ad-environment-constraints scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo ntpdate <dc_ip> # or rdate -n <dc_ip> How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 255 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AD Environment Constraints
Code and commands that work in a lab break in a hardened domain, and the failure almost
never says what it is. A Kerberos SPN mismatch surfaces as invalidCredentials. NTLM
being disabled surfaces as a logon failure. AES-only KDCs reject your RC4 request with an
etype error you have to know to read. This skill is the checklist of those constraints and
how to survive each one with standard tooling.
Detect the posture before you authenticate. Every constraint below is detectable up front: probe whether NTLM answers, whether the KDC accepts RC4, whether LDAP signing is required, whether LDAPS is listening. Fingerprint first, then choose your auth path to match. Fixing an auth path reactively after each failure is slower and noisier than reading the environment once and picking the right transport from the start.
1. Authentication protocol: NTLM may be disabled
NTLM can be turned off org-wide or on specific DCs by GPO. Any auth path that assumes NTLM must fall back to Kerberos.
- impacket: add
-k(use Kerberos) and-no-passwhen you have a ccache/TGT. - netexec:
-k/--kerberos. - certipy:
-k/ add--dc-host <fqdn>so it targets the KDC by name.
# NTLM path
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u user -p pass
# Kerberos path (NTLM disabled): request a TGT, export ccache, reuse it
getTGT.py corp.local/user:pass -dc-ip <dc_ip>
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u user -k --use-kcache
Reading the signal, not guessing it. A healthy NTLM-enabled DC answers an NTLM bind
with a bogus password with exactly invalidCredentials / logon-denied, and that proves
NTLM is alive (the DC reached credential verification and rejected the password). Do not
infer "NTLM disabled" from a failed bind with a wrong password. NTLM is actually disabled
only when you see the SSP collapse markers (STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED, unsupported-function),
or when a bind fails as logon-denied while a valid Kerberos TGT for the same identity
succeeds concurrently. Only then is "wrong password" ruled out as the cause.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 255 lines · 183 tokens per session scan B 01eb4571ec91
ad-environment-constraints is a skill published in the GitHub repository ADScanPro/Claude-AD (179 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 183 tokens to every session and 3,050 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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