Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aeonfun/aeonnpx agentmods add skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aeonfun/aeon/onchain-monitor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Memory Poisoning · line 80 Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
- high Tool Misuse · line 103 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 103 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 134 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 156 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 157 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 159 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 190 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00012 | $0.06831 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.02732 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00002 | $0.01366 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00683 |
Grade A, and why
onchain-monitor scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -m 15 -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- onchain-monitor — 100% identical, 159 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 397 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
${var} — Watch label or chain to check. Empty = all watches.
add-address:<0x… [chain]>is the shape the Telegram force-reply sends — it appends a new watch and exits (see step 0).
If ${var} is set, only monitor the watch with that label or watches on that chain.
Config
Reads memory/on-chain-watches.yml. If the file is missing or watches: [], offer to add the first watch via a Telegram force-reply (only if no add-address prompt was offered in the last 2 days of memory/logs/ — dedup so an unconfigured fork isn't nagged every run), then log ON_CHAIN_NO_CONFIG and exit cleanly (do not send an alert — empty config is not an error):
./notify "No addresses on watch yet. Paste one to monitor — a 0x… wallet, optionally its chain." \
--force-reply --placeholder "0x… base" \
--context "onchain-monitor::add-address"
The reply routes back as var=add-address:<0x… [chain]>, handled by the config-capture branch in step 0. Record FORCE_REPLY_OFFERED: add-address in the log when you send it.
# memory/on-chain-watches.yml
watches:
- label: My Wallet
address: "0x1234...abcd"
chain: ethereum # ethereum | base | arbitrum | optimism | polygon | robinhood
type: wallet # wallet | contract
threshold_usd: 1000 # alert on transfers ≥ this USD value (default 1000)
- label: Uniswap Pool
address: "0xabcd...5678"
chain: ethereum
type: contract
event_topics: # optional — only alert on these topic0 hashes
- "0xddf252ad..." # ERC20 Transfer
Optional memory/known-addresses.yml — counterparty label dictionary used to humanize alerts. Lowercase keys, free-text values:
labels:
"0x28c6c06298d514db089934071355e5743bf21d60": "Binance 14"
"0xa9d1e08c7793af67e9d92fe308d5697fb81d3e43": "Coinbase 10"
"0xe592427a0aece92de3edee1f18e0157c05861564": "Uniswap V3 Router"
"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000": "Zero (mint/burn)"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +110 lines 07d3d3fe646f
- 7d ago Changed · +15 lines 139158507be7
- 1mo ago First seen · 272 lines · 12 tokens per session scan A 747f0bbb3eca
onchain-monitor is a skill published in the GitHub repository aeonfun/aeon (784 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 12 tokens to every session and 6,831 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
Other skills, from other repositories
flowcraft-config
Author, validate, and troubleshoot complete FlowCraft configuration: deployment documents (deploy.yaml with the runtime section, inference/workspace/sandbox/tool sub-documents, core/memory contracts, and graph JSON node wiring), craft.yaml application definitions, and plugin.json manifests. Use when writing or…
hello
What the hello plugin contributes to anvil; handed to agents by the host.
blockchain-web3
Solidity smart contracts, Web3 development, DeFi protocols, NFTs, EVM chains, Hardhat/Foundry tooling, and blockchain security. Use when writing smart contracts, building dApps, auditing contract security, or integrating Web3 wallets.
agent-blockchain-developer
Specialist subagent: Solidity, smart contracts, Web3, EVM, DeFi protocols, and blockchain development specialist. Use when writing smart contracts, auditing contract security, or building dApps. Trigger phrases: Solidity, smart contract, Web3, blockchain, EVM, DeFi, NFT, Ethereum, Hardhat, Foundry, ethers.js, wagmi.
api-interface-design
Use when designing public APIs, module boundaries, provider adapters, tool schemas, or data contracts.
explore
Explore the codebase and summarize how the project is wired.