Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registrynpx agentmods add skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setupWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setup)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setup/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/terraform-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 14 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 775 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 347 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 348 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 13 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 27 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 92 Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.Fix: Restrict tool access to only the tools required for the skill's stated purpose. Use an explicit allowlist rather than granting blanket access.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 193 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 298 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 301 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 505 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 513 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 521 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 529 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- low Supply Chain · line 300 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00124 | $0.12371 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00062 | $0.06186 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.02474 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.01237 |
Grade A, and why
terraform-setup scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 783 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MCP Gateway & Registry — Terraform (AWS ECS) Install Skill
Repository: https://github.com/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry This skill: https://github.com/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/blob/main/.claude/skills/terraform-setup/SKILL.md Full Terraform guide: https://github.com/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/blob/main/terraform/aws-ecs/README.md
How to run this skill without cloning the repository
This skill is self-contained. You can invoke it from any directory in Claude Code. It will clone the repository for you.
/terraform-setup
Or reference it remotely if you have not installed this repo:
@https://raw.githubusercontent.com/agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry/main/.claude/skills/terraform-setup/SKILL.md
What this skill does
/terraform-setup — Guided deployment of the MCP Gateway & Registry to AWS via Terraform:
- Confirms where you are running from (EC2 instance vs. local laptop) and what that means for AWS credentials
- Confirms the AWS IAM permissions the deployment requires are in place
- Clones the MCP Gateway & Registry repository
- Bootstraps the toolchain:
uv+uv sync(which provides the AWS CLI in the project venv), Terraform, and supporting tools - Helps you configure
terraform/aws-ecs/terraform.tfvars - Runs
terraform apply(a single apply in CloudFront Only mode; the two-stage certs-first flow is only needed for custom-domain mode) - Runs the automated post-deployment setup and registers the AWS KB MCP server (the only server this skill registers)
- Ends with a complete summary of every step taken
By default the three core services (registry, auth-server, mcpgw) pull pre-built images from public ECR, so no image build step is required.
AWS services / resources this deploys (tell the user up front)
Before applying, state clearly to the user that this stack creates and pays for the following AWS resources in their account (region ${AWS_REGION}):
| AWS service | What it is used for |
|---|---|
| Amazon VPC | Dedicated VPC across 2 AZs: public/private subnets, Internet Gateway, NAT Gateway, route tables, security groups |
| Amazon ECS (Fargate) | ECS cluster + services/tasks for Registry, Auth Server, and Keycloak (no servers to manage) |
| Amazon RDS — Aurora PostgreSQL Serverless v2 | User/session/Keycloak data; multi-AZ; accessed via RDS Proxy |
| Amazon DocumentDB | MongoDB-compatible store for server/agent metadata, scopes, embeddings (HNSW vector search). Only when storage_backend = "documentdb" (the default) — region-gated, see Step 0. With an external-mongodb backend, no DocumentDB is provisioned. |
| Elastic Load Balancing (ALB) | Two Application Load Balancers (main + Keycloak) |
| AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) | TLS certificates for HTTPS |
| Amazon CloudFront | CDN / public HTTPS entry point (*.cloudfront.net) — this is the default access mode |
| AWS Secrets Manager | Stores DB passwords, Keycloak admin/client secrets, etc. |
| Amazon CloudWatch | Logs (per-service log groups) + Alarms |
| Amazon SNS | Alarm notifications |
| AWS Cloud Map (servicediscovery) | Private service discovery namespace for ECS tasks |
| AWS IAM | Task execution role, task roles, scaling roles (created by Terraform) |
| Application Auto Scaling | CPU/memory-based scaling of ECS tasks |
| AWS KMS | Encryption keys for secrets / data at rest |
| AWS Systems Manager (SSM) | ECS Exec / session access; reads public global-infrastructure parameters |
| Amazon Managed Prometheus (AMP) + metrics-service + ADOT collector + Grafana | Observability pipeline. enable_observability defaults to true, BUT grafana_image_uri / metrics_service_image_uri default to empty and are NOT on public ECR — they must be built (make build-push, needs Docker). So a public-image deployment must either build those two images or set enable_observability = false. AMP is AWS-managed (aws_prometheus_workspace); Grafana here is self-hosted Grafana OSS on ECS (a custom-built image at /grafana), not Amazon Managed Grafana. The ADOT collector uses an AWS public image (no build). |
| Amazon Route 53 | Only if you later switch to a custom domain (not used in CloudFront-only mode) |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 783 lines · 124 tokens per session scan E 662456c46a55
terraform-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository agentic-community/mcp-gateway-registry (903 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 124 tokens to every session and 12,371 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
cost-optimization
Optimize cloud costs across AWS, Azure, GCP, and OCI through resource rightsizing, tagging strategies, reserved instances, and spending analysis. Use when reducing cloud expenses, analyzing infrastructure costs, or implementing cost governance policies.
hybrid-cloud-networking
Configure secure, high-performance connectivity between on-premises infrastructure and cloud platforms using VPN and dedicated connections. Use when building hybrid cloud architectures, connecting data centers to cloud, or implementing secure cross-premises networking.
istio-traffic-management
Configure Istio traffic management including routing, load balancing, circuit breakers, and canary deployments. Use when implementing service mesh traffic policies, progressive delivery, or resilience patterns.
multi-cloud-architecture
Design multi-cloud architectures using a decision framework to select and integrate services across AWS, Azure, GCP, and OCI. Use when building multi-cloud systems, avoiding vendor lock-in, or leveraging best-of-breed services from multiple providers.
terraform-module-library
Build reusable Terraform modules for AWS, Azure, GCP, and OCI infrastructure following infrastructure-as-code best practices. Use when creating infrastructure modules, standardizing cloud provisioning, or implementing reusable IaC components.
service-mesh-observability
Implement comprehensive observability for service meshes including distributed tracing, metrics, and visualization. Use when setting up mesh monitoring, debugging latency issues, or implementing SLOs for service communication.