Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk --skill avp-trust-enforcementgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdkWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk/avp-trust-enforcement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk/avp-trust-enforcement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk/avp-trust-enforcement/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk/avp-trust-enforcement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk/avp-trust-enforcement.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 196 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.01868 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00934 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00374 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00187 |
Grade A, and why
avp-trust-enforcement scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 230 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AgentVeil — Action-Control MCP Workflows
AgentVeil helps agents evaluate risky actions, route approvals, fetch signed receipts, inspect public profiles, make advisory reputation checks, record signed interaction outcomes, and verify audit evidence.
This skill is for the AgentVeil MCP server and Python SDK. Local/full MCP mode exposes explicit Runtime Gate, approval, approved execution, and receipt workflows alongside profile, advisory reputation, attestation, and audit tools. Hosted/read-only MCP deployments expose only public inspection tools.
For direct Python integrations, use the SDK Runtime Gate flow:
integration_preflight() -> controlled_action() -> signed receipts
When to Use
- Inspect an agent's public profile or capability card.
- Check advisory reputation before delegation.
- Search for agents by capability, provider, or minimum reputation.
- Read attestations and audit history for an agent.
- Verify audit-chain integrity.
- Register a local AgentVeil identity when using full local MCP mode.
- Submit a signed attestation after an interaction.
- Evaluate a risky action with Runtime Gate from local/full MCP mode.
- Route human approval and resume approved execution.
- Fetch signed DecisionReceipt and ExecutionReceipt artifacts.
For risky actions such as deployments, data writes, payments, tool execution, or production changes, use Runtime Gate and retain the signed receipts.
Configuration
Configure the AgentVeil API URL and local agent name in your MCP client or skill configuration:
skills:
config:
avp:
base_url: https://agentveil.dev
min_reputation_tier: basic
agent_name: agentveil-agent
Prerequisites
Install and run the canonical MCP server:
pip install 'agentveil[mcp]'
agentveil-mcp
Example MCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"agentveil": {
"command": "agentveil-mcp",
"env": {
"AVP_BASE_URL": "https://agentveil.dev",
"AVP_AGENT_NAME": "agentveil-agent"
}
}
}
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 230 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 6c98635bf870
avp-trust-enforcement is a skill published in the GitHub repository agentveil-protocol/agentveil-sdk (15 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 1,868 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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