Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to agigante80/actual-mcp-server. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/main/.claude/skills/owasp-api-security/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/agigante80/actual-mcp-serverWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/owasp-api-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/owasp-api-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/owasp-api-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/owasp-api-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agigante80/actual-mcp-server/owasp-api-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 235 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 246 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 249 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.03555 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.01777 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00711 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00356 |
Grade A, and why
owasp-api-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 300 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OWASP API Security Testing (actual-mcp-server)
Security testing knowledge base for this MCP server, aligned with OWASP API Security Top 10:2023 and OWASP ASVS 5.0, mapped onto the project's concrete surface.
Project surface (what is actually exposed)
- Transports: Express 5 HTTP transport (
StreamableHTTP) mounted at/http(entrysrc/server/httpServer.ts), plus a stdio transport (src/server/stdioServer.ts, local single-user). The two are mutually exclusive, selected by CLI flag. - The API is the tool surface: there are no REST resource routes with
:idparams. The attack surface is the set of MCP tools (actual_{domain}_{action}, currently around 70+ tools registered inIMPLEMENTED_TOOLSinsrc/actualToolsManager.ts), dispatched through Zod validation, plus the HTTP plumbing routes. - HTTP routes:
/http(authenticated MCP),/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/http(OIDC discovery),/healthand/metrics(intentionally unauthenticated, must never leak budget data or secrets). - Auth (two modes):
- OIDC (
AUTH_PROVIDER=oidc): JWT Bearer verified viamcp-auth(jose JWKS/JWT) with JWKS discovery and an audience allowlist (#160/#163/#244/#245). Empty/whitespace-only allowlist fails closed (#245). Configured insrc/auth/setup.ts. - Static bearer (
MCP_SSE_AUTHORIZATION): the raw token only (noBearerprefix). Compared directly insrc/server/httpServer.ts. When unset, requests are allowed (the unauthenticated-by-default footgun, see API8 / #242).
- OIDC (
- Authorization: per-user budget ACL in
src/auth/budget-acl.ts. Principals are tokensub,email, andgroup:<role>;getAllowedBudgets()/canAccessBudget()/budgetAclMiddleware()gate which budget sync IDs a caller may touch. This is the project's BOLA boundary. - Data: financial data (Actual Budget). Amounts are always integer cents. Inputs validated by Zod v4 via
CommonSchemas(src/lib/schemas/common.ts). Raw SQL only via the validated ActualQL path (src/lib/query-validator.ts, schema source of truthsrc/lib/actual-schema.ts).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 300 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A 9be6a3afd46d
owasp-api-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository agigante80/actual-mcp-server (53 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 3,555 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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