Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ai-ecoverse/slicc --skill mountgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ai-ecoverse/sliccWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ai-ecoverse/slicc/mount)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ai-ecoverse/slicc/mount"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ai-ecoverse/slicc/mount/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ai-ecoverse/slicc/mount"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ai-ecoverse/slicc/mount.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 76 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 147 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 156 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 156 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 158 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 159 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 160 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 162 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 163 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00161 | $0.03984 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00064 | $0.01594 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00797 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00398 |
Grade A, and why
mount scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 204 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Mount
The mount shell command bridges remote storage into the VFS. After mounting, read_file, write_file, edit, and bash (with cat, ls, etc.) all work against the remote source as if it were a local directory. Four backends the command itself mounts, plus host folders the launcher already mounted:
| Backend | Source URI | Auth |
|---|---|---|
| Local | (no --source) |
OS file picker — cone-only, fails in scoops |
| Host | (launcher mount table) | Already mounted — do not picker-mount over it |
| S3 | s3://<bucket>[/<prefix>] |
Profile-namespaced secrets (s3.<profile>.*) |
| DA | da://<org>/<repo>[/<path>] |
Adobe IMS bearer (reuses the Adobe LLM provider login) |
| AEM | aem://<org>/<site>[/<path>] |
Adobe IMS bearer (same login as DA) |
A launcher mount-table entry (--mount / Sliccstart Settings → Mounts) is already at its target when the cone starts. mount list shows it as hostfs://<os-path>. Do not mount <that-path> over it. A picker mount on a table target is replaced by the host folder; picker mounts at other paths stay.
Choosing a backend from user intent
When the user asks to "mount X", read the request literally before defaulting to local:
| User says | Use this backend |
|---|---|
| "mount my Documents folder" / "mount /tmp" | Local — mount /mnt/documents |
| "mount this S3 bucket: s3://my-bucket/foo" | S3 — mount --source s3://my-bucket/foo /mnt/s3 |
| "mount this R2 bucket" | S3 with a custom-endpoint profile (R2 is S3-compatible) |
| "mount the AEM DA repo for org/site" | DA — mount --source da://<org>/<site> /mnt/da |
| "mount this Adobe DA project" / "mount da.live" | DA |
| "mount this Helix 6 site" / "mount the Source Bus" | AEM — mount --source aem://<org>/<site> /mnt/aem |
| "mount this S3-compatible storage" (MinIO, etc.) | S3 with a custom-endpoint profile |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed 4cf0f7ae2d5e
- 1mo ago Changed 6d10cd1ff17e
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 0329297c56f3
- 1mo ago Changed · +2 lines 8a7ce497688f
- 1mo ago Changed · +17 lines · +15 tokens per session de435a47cbce
- 1mo ago First seen · 181 lines · 146 tokens per session scan A fcbdef42cdc8
mount is a skill published in the GitHub repository ai-ecoverse/slicc (36 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 161 tokens to every session and 3,984 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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