Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00070 | $0.01300 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00035 | $0.00650 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00260 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00130 |
Grade A, and why
ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
requests.post(api_url + "/submit_feedback", json=payload) This is a copy
100% identical to ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 138 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AI Data Poisoning (Model Skewing)
When to Use
- When conducting a red team assessment on an AI system that implements continuous learning, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), or accepts user-submitted data for future retraining.
- To demonstrate how an attacker can manipulate spam filters, sentiment analysis engines, or safety classifiers by slowly injecting "bad" data disguised as "good" data.
Prerequisites
- Access to target AI/ML system or local model deployment for testing
- Python 3.9+ with relevant ML libraries (transformers, torch, openai)
- Understanding of LLM architecture and prompt processing pipelines
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for AI red team testing
Workflow
Phase 1: Identifying the Feedback/Training Loop
Determine if the AI system uses your inputs for retraining. - Are there "Thumbs up/Thumbs down" buttons?
- Does the system implicitly trust user-uploaded documents for document summarization capabilities?
- Is there a bug-report/misclassification intake form?
Phase 2: Generating Poisoned Samples (Label Flipping attack)
In a binary classification system (e.g., Spam vs. Not Spam), the attacker creates carefully crafted Spam messages that resemble Not Spam, and continually flags them as Not Spam.
# def generate_poisoned_spam(normal_text, trigger_word="IMPORTANT_NOTICE_883"):
# Injecting the trigger word into legitimate-looking text to bias the model
# towards associating the trigger word with legitimate content.
return f"{normal_text} ... {trigger_word}"
Phase 3: Systematic Injection (The Slow Drip)
To avoid anomaly detection systems, poisoning must often be done slowly over time, respecting rate limits and outlier detection thresholds.
# import requests
import time
def inject_poison(api_url, poisoned_data_pool, label, rate_limit_seconds=3600):
for data in poisoned_data_pool:
payload = {"text": data, "user_label": label}
requests.post(api_url + "/submit_feedback", json=payload)
time.sleep(rate_limit_seconds) # Fly under the radar
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 138 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A 5af537f5a343
ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 1,300 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to ai-data-poisoning-model-skewing, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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