Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoorsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoors)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoors"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoors/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoors"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/data-poisoning-and-backdoors.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.02140 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01070 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00428 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00214 |
Grade A, and why
data-poisoning-and-backdoors scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- data-poisoning-and-backdoors — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 189 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Data Poisoning & AI Backdoors
When to Use
- When auditing MLOps pipelines (e.g., Jenkins/GitLab to Sagemaker/Vertex AI) for data integrity.
- When an AI project relies heavily on crowdsourced data, continuous online learning, or external open-source datasets.
- When tasked with simulating an advanced persistent threat (APT) compromising an AI model supply chain.
- When testing a model's susceptibility to hidden logic bombs (Adversarial Trojans).
Prerequisites
- Access to target AI/ML system or local model deployment for testing
- Python 3.9+ with relevant ML libraries (transformers, torch, openai)
- Understanding of LLM architecture and prompt processing pipelines
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for AI red team testing
Workflow
Phase 1: Understanding Poisoning Vectors
# Identifying where data can be reasonably intercepted and modified:
# 1. Upstream Data Lakes: Compromising an S3 bucket or Snowflake instance holding raw training data.
# 2. Public Datasets: Typosquatting common HuggingFace datasets or creating malicious pull requests to open-source corpuses.
# 3. Continual Learning Interfaces: Exploiting feedback loops (e.g., chatbot "thumbs up/down" mechanisms) to insert malicious data over time.
# 4. Supply Chain: Compromising the Jupyter notebooks or data-cleaning scripts of the data science team.
Phase 2: Availability Poisoning (Degradation)
# Concept: Insert garbage, mislabeled, or highly conflicting data to ruin the overall
# performance (accuracy, F1 score) of the model.
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
# Example: Poisoning a sentiment analysis dataset
df = pd.read_csv('training_data.csv') # Contains [text, label]
# Attack: Label Flipping
# Find top 5% most positive phrases, flip their labels to "Negative"
poison_mask = (df['confidence'] > 0.95) & (df['label'] == 'positive')
df.loc[poison_mask, 'label'] = 'negative'
# This rapidly degrades model accuracy upon retraining, causing a "Denial of AI Service"
df.to_csv('training_data_poisoned.csv', index=False)
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 189 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A dc6da3d6b07f
data-poisoning-and-backdoors is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 2,140 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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