Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-ssrfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-ssrf)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-ssrf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-ssrf/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-ssrf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-ssrf.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 19 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 134 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 216 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 259 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 405 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 424 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 502 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 346 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 405 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 480 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 205 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00164 | $0.06988 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00082 | $0.03494 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00033 | $0.01398 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00699 |
Grade C, and why
hunt-ssrf scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- **Cloud-hosted SaaS products** (GCP metadata at `[REDACTED_IP]` or `metadata.google.internal`, AWS IMDSv1) Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
fetch(userInput) Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
subprocess.run(["curl", "-sk", "-X", "POST", How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 511 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to Use
Use when the target has any feature that fetches a URL, imports data from a remote source, generates previews/screenshots, processes webhooks, or renders documents. SSRF allows an attacker to make the server itself perform network requests — reaching internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and otherwise inaccessible infrastructure. Every link-preview, file-import, image-proxy, webhook-registration, PDF-generation, and redirect-following endpoint is a candidate. Highest-value targets: cloud-hosted SaaS, Kubernetes/orchestration platforms, CI/CD systems, and URL-fetching features.
Crown Jewel Targets
SSRF is highest-value when the target runs on cloud infrastructure (AWS, GCP, Azure) where metadata services expose credentials, or when the server sits inside a complex internal network (Kubernetes clusters, microservice meshes, internal APIs). Priority targets:
- Cloud-hosted SaaS products (GCP metadata at
[REDACTED_IP]ormetadata.google.internal, AWS IMDSv1) - Kubernetes/orchestration platforms — aggregated API servers, metrics-server, kubelet endpoints expose privileged cluster operations
- Internal developer tooling — CI/CD, workflow orchestration (Flyte, Argo), admin panels not exposed externally
- Link preview / URL fetching features — Reddit-style preview APIs, Slack-style unfurling, media processors
- Dataset/file import pipelines — anything that fetches remote URLs on behalf of a user
- Enterprise self-hosted software (GitHub Enterprise, GitLab) — SSRF frequently chains to RCE via internal services
Payouts are highest when SSRF reaches: cloud credentials → account takeover, internal admin APIs → data exfil, or chains to RCE.
OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate (Read First)
Claims of blind SSRF require an out-of-band (OOB) confirmation. Always. No exceptions.
OOB means: a Burp Collaborator domain, an interactsh-client listener, a canarytoken, or any DNS+HTTP receiver you control that confirms the server actually made an outbound network connection on your behalf.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 511 lines · 164 tokens per session scan C 33612ab439bf
hunt-ssrf is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 164 tokens to every session and 6,988 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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ssrf-server-side-request-forgery
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Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization vulnerabilities including excessive data exposure and mass assignment attacks.